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ABSTRACT
This Article reexamines the nexus of relationships among informed
transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets in
the context of public policy debates about insider trading and its regulation. The Article analyzes this nexus, with the emphasis on recent empirical studies and developments in the securities industry, from a variety of
perspectives and considers the validity of the alleged link between insider
trading—as opposed to other forms of informed trading—and market
liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The nexus of relationships among informed transactions, information
asymmetry, and liquidity of securities markets is an important part of
public policy debates about insider trading and its regulation.1 The alleged
harm of insiders’ transactions on superior information to market makers,
entities that provide liquidity in securities markets,2 and, as a result, to
other traders in the form of lower market liquidity3 is frequently cited as
an economic cost of insider trading4 and used to justify regulation.5 The
1

See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 passim (2004)
[hereinafter Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread]; Stanislav Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity in Complex Securities: The Impact of Insider Trading on Options Market Makers, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 387 passim
(2010) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity].
2
The boundaries of the term “market maker” are blurry and go beyond market participants designated, or recognized as such, by trading venues and specialized over-thecounter dealers. See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter SEC’s Concept
Release on Equity Market Structure] (“The use of certain strategies by some proprietary
firms [engaging in high-frequency trading] has, in many trading centers, largely replaced
the role of specialists and market makers with affirmative and negative obligations.”);
John Cassidy, Hedge Clipping, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 28, 33 (“Basically, [several top-performing hedge funds] are the largest market-making firms in the world ....
[engaged] in sucking up tick-by-tick data, processing all those data, and converting them
into second-by-second positions in thousands of spreads worldwide. It’s just algorithmic
market-making.”) (quoting Harry Kat, Professor of Risk Management, City University
London).
3
The original argument about the adverse impact of informed trading, including insider trading, on market liquidity caused by an additional cost to market makers was
made in Walter Bagehot [Jack L. Treynor], The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Mar.–Apr. 1971, at 12, 13–14. However, a much earlier source made the diametrically
opposite argument: such transactions should decrease bid-ask spreads by creating additional market activity. F. LAVINGTON, THE ENGLISH CAPITAL MARKET 248, 260 (1921).
4
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 105; see
also Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 62
(2006) [hereinafter Illegal Insider Trading Hearings] (prepared testimony of John C.
Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) (“As informed traders increase their trading upon asymmetric information, bid/asked spreads are
likely to widen on all stocks .... [Hence,] insider trading causes the cost of equity capital
to rise, and this in turn has a macro-economic effect on GNP, employment, and the economy as a whole.”); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violation When
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 312–13 (“Since market makers and
specialists have difficulty knowing whether they are dealing with ... inside-informationinformed traders or with uninformed outsiders, they cover the expected costs of being on
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analysis of the alleged link between informed trading and different dimensions of market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads and market depths, has
produced an avalanche of empirical studies, such as efforts to quantify the
“adverse selection” component of bid-ask spreads and analysis of event
and cross-country data,6 and even experimental research.7 These studies
have examined a variety of trading venues, notably the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), NASDAQ,
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong (HKSE). On the other hand, the line between insider trading and
other forms of informed trading in these studies was frequently blurry.
the other side of trades with informed traders through the bid/ask spread they offer all
traders.”); M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505,
512 (2011) (“Specialists making markets in a firm’s stock in which insiders might be
trading will increase the bid-ask spread to compensate for the risk that they are trading at
an informational disadvantage, and this will reduce liquidity and raise the firm’s cost of
capital.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 589 (2005) (“[I]nsider trading
increase[s] the transaction costs of trading to specialists, market makers, and investors by
widening the bid-ask spread ....”).
5
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 90 &
nn.35–36, 106–07 & nn.112–15; see also Illegal Insider Trading Hearings, supra note 4,
at 95 (prepared testimony of Jonathan Macey, Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law,
Yale University) (arguing that “insider trading increases the transaction costs of investing; particularly by increasing the bid-asked spreads .... [which is one of the reasons why]
regulation of insider trading protects investors and, in doing so, encourages the development of high quality capital markets”); Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and
Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and
Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 261–62 (2007) (viewing the alleged harm imposed on market makers by insider trading as a potential explanation for the correlation
between more stringent insider trading regulation and greater market liquidity); Aaron
Gilbert et al., Insiders and the Law: The Impact of Regulatory Change on Insider Trading, 47 MGMT. INT’L REV. 745, 763 (2007) (arguing that insider trading regulation leads
to “a significant reduction of the microstructure effects of insider trading [including lower
bid-ask spreads]” and stressing “the positive economic spin-offs a healthy financial
market brings”).
6
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, passim;
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim.
7
See Robert Bloomfield, Quotes, Prices, and Estimates in a Laboratory Market, 51 J.
FIN. 1791, 1806 (1996); Jan Pieter Krahnen & Martin Weber, Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?, 4 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 55, 80–81 (2001); Charles
R. Schnitzlein, Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms Under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation, 51 J. FIN. 613, 614 (1996); Andreas Oehler et al.,
Do Insiders Contribute to Market Efficiency? Informational Efficiency and Liquidity of
Experimental Call Markets with and Without Insiders 15 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), available at http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/22490
/1/bafifo11.pdf.
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Insiders’ transactions on superior information can take forms other
than purchases and sales of equity securities. Numerous empirical studies
suggest the existence of informed trading, a significant portion of which
probably consists of insider trading, in the form of equity short selling8
and transactions in equity options, debt instruments, single stock futures,
and credit default swaps.9 Overall, there is little evidence that insider trading has posed a significant concern for equity market makers,10 apart from
occasional references that these market participants may want to identify
specific orders based on inside information in order to engage in price
8

See Ronald Anderson et al., Family Controlled Firms and Informed Trading: Evidence from Short Sales, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 30–32) (on file with author),
available at http://www.afajof.org/afa/forthcoming/7865.pdf; Ekkehart Boehmer et al.,
Which Shorts Are Informed?, 63 J. FIN. 491, 524–25 (2008); Stephen E. Christophe et al.,
Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements, 59 J. FIN. 1845, 1873–74 (2004); Hemang Desai et al., An Investigation of the Informational Role of Short Interest in the
Nasdaq Market, 52 J. FIN. 2263, 2286 (2002); Bidisha Chakrabarty & Andriy Shkilko,
Information Leakages in Financial Markets: Evidence from Shorting Around Insider
Sales 27–28 (Mar. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083795.
9
See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, More Insiders, More Insider Trading:
Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 500 (2010) (credit default
swaps, debt instruments, and equity options); Turan G. Bali & Armen Hovakimian,
Volatility Spreads and Expected Stock Returns, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1797, 1811 (2009) (equity
options); Charles Cao et al., The Information Content of Option-Implied Volatility for
Credit Default Swap Valuation, 13 J. FIN. MKTS. 321, 339–40 (2010) (credit default
swaps and equity options); Melanie Cao & Jason Wei, Option Market Liquidity: Commonality and Other Characteristics, 13 J. FIN. MKTS. 20, 46 (2010) (equity options); Charles
Collver, Measuring the Impact of Option Market Activity on the Stock Market: Bivariate
Point Process Models of Stock and Option Transactions, 12 J. FIN. MKTS. 87, 103–04
(2009) (equity options); Martijn Cremers & David Weinbaum, Deviations from Put-Call
Parity and Stock Return Predictability, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 335, 337–
38 (2010) (equity options); Bartley R. Danielsen et al., Single Stock Futures as a Substitute for Short Sales: Evidence from Microstructure Data, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1273,
1291 (2009) (single stock futures); Richard Roll et al., O/S: The Relative Trading Activity
in Options and Stock, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 2, 16 (2010) (equity options); Kildeep Shastri et
al., Information Revelation in the Futures Market: Evidence from Single Stock Futures,
28 J. FUTURES MKTS. 335, 347 (2008) (single stock futures); Andrew Ang et al., The
Joint Cross Section of Stocks and Options 39–40 (Nov. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533089 (equity options); Lars Norden, Credit Derivatives, Corporate News, and Credit Ratings 28–29 (Oct.
18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www
.bundesbank.de/download/vfz/konferenzen/20081211_ffm/paper_norden.pdf (credit default swaps); Xing Zhou, Information-Based Trading in the Junk Bond Market 22–24
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.cis.upenn
.edu/~mkearns/finread/junk_bond.pdf (debt instruments and equity options).
10
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, passim.
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discrimination—for instance, via non-firm quotes—or to follow the lead.11
Analogously, there are only a few episodes documenting real harm to
equity market makers from insider trading, which, nevertheless, do not
clearly indicate the existence of a consistent practice of widening bid-ask
spreads for all trades in response to insider trading.12 On the other hand,
this type of harm is evident from the position taken by options market
makers and the options industry.13 These observations raise the question
about the nature of harm imposed by insider trading on market makers,
and the magnitude of the social cost caused by lower liquidity of equity
markets14 or derivatives markets.15 Another important consideration is the
11

See, e.g., Bernard Attard, Making a Market. Jobbers of the London Stock Exchange,
1800–1986, 7 FIN. HIST. REV. 5, 18 (2000) (quoting an unnamed equity market maker on
his likely responses to suspected insider trading by a specific customer).
12
See, e.g., RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 358
(1999) (describing an incident in 1949 when equity market makers were harmed by
transactions of insiders affiliated with dog race track companies based on information
obtained from a government official that “the wartime ban on mid-week dog racing was
to be relaxed”).
13
See Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim.
14
Although the link between greater liquidity of equity markets and increased firm
value is not entirely uncontroversial, there are several asset pricing and corporate governance-related rationales for this relationship. See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the
Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 100–02 & nn.99–106; see also Yakov Amihud & Haim
Mendelson, Liquidity, the Value of the Firm, and Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Spring 2008, at 32; Vivian W. Fang et al., Stock Market Liquidity and Firm Value,
94 J. FIN. ECON. 150 (2009).
15
A comprehensive survey of empirical studies of the impact of derivatives on markets in underlying assets, including evidence pertaining to equity options, suggested that
“the introduction of derivatives does not destabilize the underlying market .... [and] tends
to improve the liquidity and informativeness of markets.” Stewart Mayhew, The Impact
of Derivatives on Cash Markets: What Have We Learned?, at i (Feb. 3, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://media.terry.uga.edu/docu
ments/finance/impact.pdf. The theoretical underpinning is that derivatives can “complete” the market in question, pushing it closer to Pareto efficiency, and improve price
discovery by processing additional information. See Richard Roll et al., Options Trading
Activity and Firm Valuation, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 345, 345–46 (2009); Stephen A. Ross,
Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75 passim (1976); Mark Rubenstein, An Economic
Evaluation of Organized Options Markets, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 49, 52–53,
56–57 (1979). For more direct empirical evidence suggesting that active options markets
increase firm value, see Roll et al., supra, at 349. Compare Ramesh P. Rao & Christopher
K. Ma, The Effect of Call-Option-Listing Announcement on Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.
BUS. RES. 449, 461 (1987) (documenting negative excess equity returns associated with
announcements of the introduction of exchange-traded standardized options and positive
excess equity returns associated with the commencement of trading of such options and
arguing that this phenomenon is attributed to the expectation that such instruments would
destabilize equity trading in the future and additional demand stimulated by additional
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extent to which this social cost can be effectively controlled via regulatory
means.
This Article reexamines, with the emphasis on recent empirical studies
and developments in the securities industry, the nexus of relationships
among informed transactions, information asymmetry, and liquidity of
securities markets in the context of public policy debates about insider
trading and its regulation. The topics covered are: (1) the nature of market
makers’ losses from insider trading and the significance of inventory management in various markets; (2) the distinction between insider trading and
other forms of informed trading; (3) the importance of disentangling informed trading, informational asymmetry, and uncertainty; (4) bid-ask
spread decomposition studies; (5) the connection among estimates of the
probability of informed trading and bid-ask spreads and their components;
(6) various mechanisms for providing liquidity; (7) the examination of
unregulated securities markets and the impact of insider trading regulation
on market liquidity; and (8) the significance of firm characteristics. The
Article concludes by examining the alleged link between insider trading
and market liquidity as a justification for the existence of regulation based
on the weight of empirical evidence, stressing the importance of the distinction between insider trading and other types of informed trading, and
suggesting directions for future empirical research.
I. THE NATURE OF MARKET MAKERS’ LOSSES FROM INSIDER TRADING
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT IN VARIOUS
MARKETS
The idea that market makers are harmed by insider trading—or informed trading more generally—has an intuitive appeal:
risk-return combinations), with Bartley R. Danielsen & Sorin M. Sorescu, Why Do Option Introductions Depress Stock Prices? A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constrains,
36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 451, 451 (2001) (documenting negative excess
equity returns associated with the commencement of trading of exchange-traded standardized options and explaining this phenomenon by the mitigation of constraints on short
selling), and with Stewart Mayhew & Vassil Mihov, Short Sale Constraints, Overvaluation, and the Introduction of Options 21 (Oct. 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=544245 (finding that the commencement of trading of exchange-traded standardized options does not produce negative
excess equity returns). But see Bartley R. Danielsen et al., Reassessing the Impact of
Option Introductions on Market Quality: A Less Restrictive Test for Event-Date Effects,
42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1041, 1061 (2007) (arguing that “previous studies
have misinterpreted ex ante changes as option introduction effects” and “[i]n most cases,
market quality, as measured by spreads, trading volume, and volatility, peaks before the
option listing date”).

8

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:001

In many markets, any insider always trades directly with a market maker—or at least preempts him from making a favorable trade—because
the latter, as a marginal trader, absorbs with his capital all immediate
order imbalances, and this argument appears to demonstrate the existence of actual losses inflicted on market makers.16

It follows that insider trading may be harmful to such dimensions of
market liquidity as bid-ask spreads, as a proxy for compensation to a market maker for providing liquidity,17 and market depths, as a proxy for the
extent of liquidity offered by a market maker.18
On the other hand, market makers do not passively absorb order imbalances; instead, they actively manage their inventories and target some
preferred inventory level in equity markets19 or some market-neutral posi-

16

Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 395.
Some trading venues also allow market makers to collect special rebates for executed transactions by posting “passive” orders—typically at the expense of access fees
borne by traders submitting “aggressive” orders—and such rebates in this pricing model,
which is known as “maker-taker” or “make-or-take,” serve as another method of compensating market makers for providing liquidity in addition to profits from bid-ask
spreads. See SEC’s Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3598–
99, 3608; MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 57–58 (2010).
18
See Dominique Dupont, Market Making, Prices, and Quantity Limits, 13 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1129, 1130 (2000) (a formal model finding that “the theoretical dealer adjusts the
depth proportionally more than the bid-ask spread in response to changes in the degree of
informational asymmetry” caused by the presence of informed trading).
19
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 110–16
& nn.123–58; Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 395
& n.24, 400 & n.41. For general sources on inventory management by equity market
makers, see M.F.M. OSBORNE, THE STOCK MARKET FROM A PHYSICIST’S POINT OF VIEW
48–51 (1977); Pamela C. Moulton, Inventory Effects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 976 passim (Rama Cont ed., 2010). For empirical evidence on
equity market markets’ inventory management, see Carole Camerton-Forde et al., Time
Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker Inventories and Revenues, 65 J. FIN.
295, 325–26 (2010) (evidence from the NYSE); Oliver Hansch, The Cross-Sectional
Determinants of Inventory Control and the Subtle Effects of ADRs, 28 J. BANKING & FIN.
1915, 1931 (2004) (evidence from the LSE); Terrence Hendershott & Mark S. Seasholes,
Market Maker Inventories and Stock Prices, 97 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 210,
214 (2007) (evidence from the NYSE); Bülent Köksal, Participation Strategy of the
NYSE Specialists to the Posted Quotes, 21 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 314, 329–30 (2010)
(evidence from the NYSE); Narayan Y. Naik & Pradeep K. Yadav, Do Dealer Firms
Manage Inventory on a Stock-by-Stock or a Portfolio Basis?, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 349–
50 (2003) (evidence from the LSE); Sigridur Benediktsdottir, An Empirical Analysis of
Specialist Trading Behavior at the New York Stock Exchange 3–4 (Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 876, 2006), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2006/876/ifdp876.pdf (evidence from the NYSE).
17
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tion in options markets20—and hence control their risk exposure to price
movements.21 Furthermore, informed trading does not necessarily create
order imbalances22 or push a market maker away from his preferred level
of risk exposure.23 More generally, the impact of informed trading on
market makers is ambiguous because intervening inventory managementrelated transactions may take place during the time gap between the informed transaction in question and the recognition of this piece of information by the market.24 Of course, the maximum harm is inflicted when
the relevant piece of information, holding its price impact constant, is
immediately disclosed to, or otherwise absorbed by, the market. It follows
that market makers are likely to be significantly harmed by trading on
short-lived information because of various complications with offsetting
such transactions and inferring their information content. However, this
scenario does not necessarily characterize true insider trading on the basis
of “soft” or “hard” information, as it often takes place days or weeks—if
not longer—in advance.
The magnitude of the harm inflicted by informed trading largely depends on the ease of inventory management—and hence market liquidity—and insider trading in particular is of real concern for specific types of
market makers.25 One category consists of market makers of equity
blocks, as this market is inherently less liquid, although it is also less anonymous and more reliant on reputation.26 Another category represents
options market makers because they “trade multiple options with different
20

See Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 403–07
& nn.53–74.
21
One key factor is that risk exposure of market makers may be magnified in several
instances. For options market makers, this situation may arise because of the leveraged
nature and other attributes of the risk profile of options. See id. at 399, 408–09. Another
consideration is that an equity market maker may short sell shares of stock that he does
not own. See DURBIN, supra note 17, at 56. In this case, the exposure of this market
participant is also magnified—with a theoretical possibility of unlimited losses. For the
recent regulatory restrictions on short selling activities of both equity and options market
makers, see Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed.
Reg. 11,232 (Feb. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
22
Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 111.
23
Id. at 113.
24
Id. at 110–11.
25
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, passim.
26
See id. at 396 & n.26; see also Hendrik Bessembinder & Kumar Venkataraman,
Does an Electronic Stock Exchange Need an Upstairs Market?, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 31–32
(2004) (examining block trades on the Paris Bourse intermediated by upstairs brokers,
which can act as either agents or principals, and arguing that these market participants
certify certain orders as uninformed).

10
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expiration dates and strike prices, which are less liquid and more leveraged than underlying securities, face limitations of dynamic and static
hedging of options as nonlinear derivatives, and assume additional risk by
creating options instead of trading from their inventories.”27 As one executive of a leading options market making firm has noted, “[i]n some
markets, insider trading is so bad that we have given up making markets
for options on smaller stocks altogether.”28
The countervailing force for market makers is the potential value of
observing order flow to infer informed trading ahead of the market.29 As
an illustration, one study concluded that, “[o]nce [informed] traders have
been identified ... the market maker [on the Boston Options Exchange
enters into] ... a subsequent trade in the same option and adopts positions
that follow the informed trader.”30 This advantage, probably largely
eroded in many markets because of recent technological and institutional
changes,31 depends on the percentage of total order flow observed by the
market maker in question and transparency of transactions in real time to
other market participants.32 There is some empirical evidence that certain
types of market makers are informed traders as proxied by their profits
from position-taking, in addition to their gains from providing liquidity via
realized bid-ask spreads.33 Since many of these examples come from mar27

Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 408. For a
recent study that provides empirical evidence that informed trading has a clear effect on
liquidity of options markets in contrast to equity markets, see Cao & Wei, supra note 9,
at 45–46.
28
Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Interactive Brokers Grp.,
Speech Before the International Options Market Association 3 (Apr. 12, 2005), http://
www.interactivebrokers.com/en/general/about/commentLetters/IOA_Speech.pdf.
29
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 116 &
nn.159–62.
30
Nabil Khoury et al., PIP Transactions, Price Improvement, Informed Trades and
Order Execution, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 211, 226 (2010).
31
See, e.g., Letter from Greg Tusar, Managing Dir., Goldman Sachs Clearing & Execution, L.P. & Matthew Lavicka, Managing Dir., Goldman, Sachs & Co., to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (June 25, 2010), available at http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-243.pdf (“[C]hanges in the business models of
many exchanges and advancements in technology have eliminated or reduced the value
of the special time and place privileges traditionally enjoyed by specialists and registered
market makers ....”).
32
Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 116–18 &
nn.162–69.
33
See Amber Anand & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Information and the Intermediary:
Are Market Intermediaries Informed Traders in Electronic Markets?, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 26–27 (2008) (evidence from equity trading on the Toronto
Stock Exchange); Michael F. Ferguson & Steven C. Mann, Execution Costs and Their
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kets other than equities and equity options, it is likely that such trading
profits largely arise from the exploitation of informational advantages that
are not based on observing true insiders’ transactions.34 Some empirical
evidence even indicates that certain market makers do not gain or lose
money on position-taking,35 but these seemingly contradictory results may
be explained by institutional and regulatory differences, such as affirmative and negative obligations of market makers.36
There is some empirical evidence that market makers profit from observing insiders’ transactions. For instance, one study analyzed registered
Intraday Variation in Futures Markets, 74 J. BUS. 125, 157 (2001) (evidence from foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange); Alex Frino et al., Local Trader Profitability in Futures Markets: Liquidity
and Position Taking Profits, 30 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1, 17 (2010) (evidence from interest
rate, government securities, and equity index futures trading on the Sydney Futures
Exchange); Alexander Kurov & Dennis J. Lasser, Price Dynamics in the Regular and EMini Futures Markets, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 365, 381–82 (2004) (evidence from equity index futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange); Benediktsdottir, supra note 19, at 3–4 (evidence from equity trading on the NYSE); Michel
van der Wel et al., Are Market Makers Uninformed and Passive? Signing Trades in the
Absence of Quotes 20–21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 395, 2009),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr395.html (evidence
from government securities futures trading on the Chicago Board of Trade).
34
In the recent past, the issue of potential abuses of informational advantages effectively conferred by the NYSE’s trading architecture on its market makers—then called
“specialists”—was quite controversial. See, e.g., Market Structure III: The Role of the
Specialist in the Evolving Modern Marketplace: Field Hearing Before the Subcom. on
Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th
Cong. 56 (2004) (prepared statement of Robert Greenfield, President and Chief Executive
Officer, NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.) (arguing that the practice of “‘stepping ahead’ of
customer orders and a host of other occurrences with equally disturbing names like ‘penny-jumping,’ ‘holding up cancel requests,’ and ‘matching the public’ .... [were caused by
the specialists’ exclusive access to] non-public material information about the trading
characteristics of their assigned stock”). Ultimately, the NYSE eliminated the “advance
‘look’ at incoming orders,” which was previously available to specialists, for their successors, “designated market makers.” Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change To
Create a New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. Reg.
64,379, 64,389 (Oct. 24, 2008).
35
See Joel Hasbrouck & George Sofianos, The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialists, 48 J. FIN. 1565, 1588 (1993) (evidence from equity
trading on the NYSE); Oliver Hansch et al., Preferencing, Internalization, Best Execution, and Dealer Profits, 54 J. FIN. 1799, 1801–02 (1999) (evidence from equity trading
on the LSE); Michaël Dewally et al., Determinants of Trading Profits of Individual Traders: Risk Premia or Information 31 (Mar. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535543 (evidence from energy futures
trading on NYMEX).
36
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 118.
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transactions by insiders on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ from
1988 to 2002, when such transactions were reported with a significant
delay, and suggested that equity market makers were able to identify information-based orders and execute them at adjusted prices.37 Furthermore, the study asserted that “[m]arket makers do not front-run informed
trades before the trade. However, with the large initial stock price adjustment, the market maker shares into the insider profits.”38 A companion
study of insiders’ registered transactions from the same time period and
trading venues found that market makers’ quote revisions are greater for
insiders’ purchases compared to other purchases, and it also pointed to
“[t]he piggy-backing of market makers on insider trades.”39 Another related study concluded that equity market makers on the NYSE and the
AMEX increase price sensitivity before both scheduled and unscheduled
corporate announcements, “suggest[ing] that market makers are able to
extract and react to information related to timing.”40 In any instance, the
analysis of the overall impact of insider trading on market makers must
take into account both potential costs and benefits of this practice.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSIDER TRADING AND OTHER FORMS
OF INFORMED TRADING
In the context of the link between insider trading and market liquidity,
it is critical to make the distinction between true insider trading and other
forms of informed trading, despite the blurry economic and legal boundaries of these types of transactions. The gamut of informational advantages
in securities markets is rather broad, with different types of companyspecific, including security-specific, and non-company-specific information that may be inherently concentrated or dispersed among different
37

A. Can Inci & H. Nejat Seyhun, How Do Quotes and Prices Evolve Around Isolated Informed Trades?, J. ECON. & FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4, 6, 20) (on file
with author).
38
Id. (manuscript at 3).
39
A. Can Inci et al., Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades Around Insider
Trading, FIN. MGMT., Spring 2010, at 323, 341.
40
Joon Chae, Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information, 60
J. FIN. 413, 415 (2005). Another contribution concluded that bid-ask spreads for stocks
on the NYSE do not change before unanticipated announcements, as opposed to anticipated announcements, and argued that, “[b]efore unanticipated events, if there is informed trading, the market maker either does not recognize it or does not react to it.”
John R. Graham et al., Information Flow and Liquidity Around Anticipated and Unanticipated Dividend Announcements, 79 J. BUS. 2301, 2302–03 (2006). However, an alternative interpretation is that informed trading provides market makers with valuable
information about future price moves—not just signals about increased volatility.
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market participants. Such advantages may stem from the possession of
pieces of information that originate inside the company whose securities
are being traded—or even another company, such as a potential acquirer—
or may be based on macroeconomic, industry-wide, and other similar
outside factors.41 Informed trading may also be based on the quickness of
reaction to public information.42 In addition, market participants’ “knowledge of their own inventory and customer order flow may convey information about fundamentals, short-term price fluctuations, or customer
demand.”43
Overall, market makers are likely to be seriously disadvantaged “by
trading on short-lived information stemming from non-instantaneous dissemination of public announcements, advance knowledge of certain trading trends or incoming orders, or certain advantages in acquiring, processing, and aggregating public information.”44 One example of a market par41

For empirical studies discussing informed trading and price discovery in markets
for basket- and index-based securities, see Rafiqul Bhuyan et al., LEAPS of Faith: A
Trading Indicator Based on CBOE S&P 500 LEAPS Option Open Interest Information, J.
INVESTING, Summer 2010, at 85; Kam C. Chan et al., Do Options Contribute to Price
Discovery in Emerging Markets?, 1 INT’L REV. ACCT. BANKING & FIN. 92 (2009); Jeff
Fleming et al., Trading Costs and Relative Rates of Price Discovery in Stock, Futures,
and Option Markets, 16 J. FUTURES MKTS. 353 (1996).
42
See, e.g., Hee-Joon Ahn et al., Informed Trading in the Index Option Market: The
Case of KOSPI 200 Options, 28 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1118, 1121 (2008) (arguing that
“sophisticated investors [can] capitalize on their superior information-processing skills
and/or their superior trading skills .... [resulting in] information-motivated trading based
on public information”); Pierluigi Balduzzi et al., Economic News and Bond Prices:
Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Market, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 523, 539
(2001) (arguing that “asymmetry arises not because different information is received by
traders, but because traders may have differing ability to process the information”); T.
Clifton Green, Economic News and the Impact of Trading on Bond Prices, 59 J. FIN.
1201, 1202 (2004) (arguing that “the release of public information raises the level of
information asymmetry .... [because] some market participants have an advantage at
determining [the impact of] macro news”); see also Ryan Riordan et al., Public Information Arrival: Price Discovery and Liquidity in Electronic Limit Order Markets 2 (Apr. 4,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=1620425 (“Most news is still read by humans but news providers have started to
offer newswire products with machine-learning systems that specifically cater to algorithmic traders.”).
43
Roger D. Huang et al., Information-Based Trading in the Treasury Note Interdealer
Broker Market, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 269, 270 (2002).
44
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397; see also Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the
Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 140 (1988) (“Perhaps information from which
market-makers must protect themselves is related to superior analytical ability among
some investors rather than information obtained by legally defined insiders.”); Oliver
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ticipant in today’s high-speed securities markets, whose presence may
harm a market maker, is “a quantitative trader ... who performs bleedingedge statistical analysis on screaming-fast computing hardware .... [to]
make reasonably confident predictions based on very strong alpha signals,
thereby seeing something in the markets that others do not, or at least
before they do.”45 Market makers may even be disadvantaged by shortterm trading activities of their counterparts in a related market, with the
latter getting ahead of the former’s transactions.46 Furthermore, the feasibility of various short-trading activities has been aided by decreased bidask spreads in many markets: “[W]hen spreads narrow to a penny or less,
it’s that much easier for a small informational advantage by the wellinformed trader to become a costly disadvantage to the less-informed
market maker.”47

Kim & Robert E. Verrecchia, Market Liquidity and Volume Around Earnings Announcements, 17 J. ACCT. & ECON. 41, 44 (1994) (“The ability of information processors to
produce superior assessments of a firm’s performance on the basis of an earnings announcement provides them with a comparative information advantage over market makers.”).
45
DURBIN, supra note 17, at 93–94. The existence of such market participants, which
are exemplified by high-frequency traders, explains both why traditional market makers
have to catch on in terms of technology and why high-frequency traders themselves are
becoming a part of the market making industry. See id. at vi, 92–94; see also Letter from
Paul O’Donnell, Chief Operating Officer & Anna Westbury, Head of Compliance and
Regulatory Affairs, BATS Trading Ltd., to the Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 2 (Apr.
30, 2010), available at http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/publications/BATSEurope
_CESRmicrostructuresubmission_20100430.pdf (“The democratisation of market making
is now such that any appropriately constituted firm can become a liquidity provider.
However, such liquidity providers have automated their trading in order that they are able
to remain efficient and competitive.”); Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 1 (June 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments
/265-26/265-26-23.pdf (“[High-frequency traders] have elbowed out Market Makers by
copying or even bettering Market Makers’ quotes but for very small sizes.”). On the other
hand, the set of techniques for providing liquidity employed by high-frequency traders
tends to differ from those employed by traditional market makers: “[T]he high-frequency
trader must resort to more innovative, aggressive, and (some would say) predatory strategies than those of traditional market-makers.... The high-frequency trader is also more
selective than the pure market-maker when it comes to choosing which securities to trade
....” DURBIN, supra note 17, at 40. For a further analysis of these distinctions, see SEC’s
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3607–08.
46
DURBIN, supra note 17, at 69–70.
47
Id. at 94.

2012]

INSIDER TRADING, INFORMED TRADING

15

Similarly, market makers are likely to be harmed by stale quotes
caused by various institutional, regulatory, and other frictions.48 This problem is compounded in options markets “because of the increased difficulty
of updating quotations in multiple series of options on the same underlying security, increasing the risk that a trader may trade against a stilldisplayed stale price.”49 One historical illustration points to courtroom
struggles between market makers and “SOES bandits” and “RAES bandits,” short-term traders exploiting stale quotes for stocks on NASDAQ
and for options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), respectively, via small-sized transactions.50 The existence of “flash orders”/“step-up mechanisms” in options markets is also rationalized as a
response by market makers to the intertwined concerns about stale quotes
48

Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397 & n.33;
see also INT’L SEC. EXCH., POSITION PAPER ON FLASH ORDERS IN THE U.S. OPTIONS
MARKET 3 n.1 (2009), available at http://www.ise.com/assets/files/about_ise/ISE_Posi
tion_Paper_on_Flash_Website.pdf (“[T]he market could move so quickly that a liquidity
provider may not be able to update his quote quickly enough to avoid an opportunistic
professional trader from trading against the still-displayed stale price.”); Jon “Doctor J”
Najarian, A New Options Game: The Market Taker, in MASTER TRADERS: STRATEGIES
FOR SUPERIOR RETURNS FROM TODAY’S TOP TRADERS 205, 208 (Fari Hamzei ed., 2006)
(“The market makers ... [may] find themselves on the other side of thousands of options
contracts at a price that was stale by a second—and more times than not, the advantage
will be to the computerized trading program and not to the market maker ....”); Thomas
Peterffy, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before
the 2010 General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges 6 (Oct. 11, 2010),
http://interactivebrokers.com/download/worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf (“It obviously
takes much longer for the market maker to move thousands of quotes than for the [highfrequency trader] to hit a handful.”).
49
Letter from Thomas F. Price, Managing Dir., Equity Options Trading Comm., Sec.
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-95.pdf; see
also Letter from Michael J. Simon, Sec’y, Int’l Sec. Exch., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/com
ments/s7-21-09/s72109-83.pdf (“By providing liquidity to multiple series of options on
the same underlying instrument options market makers expose themselves to much greater risk than their equity counterparts. Persons ‘sweeping’ liquidity in the options market
can hit multiple quotations virtually simultaneously, requiring market makers to buy (or
sell) a much higher dollar amount of securities than in the cash market.”).
50
See Cathedral Trading, LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 199 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855–
56 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Datek Sec. Corp v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 875 F. Supp.
230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For background information on “SOES bandits” and “RAES
bandits,” see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 109
n.119; Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 397 n.33.
Options market makers on the Pacific Stock Exchange also experienced a similar problem. See Laura Johnson, P-Coast Intros Measures to Protect Market Makers from HiTech Arbitrage, WALL ST. LETTER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 1.
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and short-term informed trading.51 A much earlier example similarly
points to the harm to options market makers on the CBOE from “tape
racing,” the practice of taking “advantage of time disparities between the
actual trades [in underlying securities] and the transaction being disseminated via the price reporting system .... result[ing] in smaller, less liquid
[options] markets.”52 Furthermore, recent proposals to impose a mandatory minimum duration for quotes were criticized, because “the likelihood
that your quotes become stale [would] increase significantly.... [allowing
others] to trade on your outdated quotes and thus pocket an easy profit.
Effectively as a market maker you would be short a strangle every time
you post a two sided market.”53 Turning to empirical evidence, one study
found a positive correlation between the speed of quote adjustment and
realized spreads as a measure of market makers’ revenues for stocks on

51

See INT’L SEC. EXCH., supra note 48, at 3 (“[L]iquidity providers may rationally determine not to publicly display the full size they are willing to trade at specific price
points in today’s rapidly moving electronic markets due to ‘pick off’ concerns. However,
these market participants may be willing to provide liquidity when shown a flash order.”)
(footnote omitted); Letter from Thomas F. Price, Managing Dir., Equity Options Trading
Comm., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09
/s72109-145.pdf (“Quoting in size ... increases the risk to the market-maker of losses
resulting from having quotes opportunistically accessed by sophisticated traders who may
have superior information or take advantage of the momentary lags in a market-maker’s
ability to update quotes to reflect new information that the market-maker receives.... [A]
ban on flash orders would reduce the incentive of market makers on traditional exchanges
to quote in size ....”); Larry Harris, The Economics of Flash Orders 4 (Dec. 4, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/com
ments/s7-21-09/s72109-97.pdf (“[F]lash facilities ... allow [market makers] to avoid
offering liquidity to high speed traders who have learned about material information
moments before [them] .... This information may include electronically transmitted
headlines or information about the prices of correlated securities. In either event, liquidity
suppliers who offer firm quotes risk losing to faster well-informed traders.”). However,
one point of view is that “flash orders increase the probability that a displayed quotation
will trade with an informed order, which decreases the incentive to display aggressive
quotations,” with corresponding implications for liquidity. Letter from John A. McCarthy, Gen. Counsel, Global Elec. Trading Co., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 3 (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09
/s72109-142.pdf.
52
C.B.O.E. MARKET MAKER ASS’N, MARKET MAKER REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF TAPE
RACING 3 (1976), http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers
/1970/1976_0429_TapeRacingT.pdf.
53
Thierry Rijper et al., Optiver Holding B.V., High Frequency Trading 15 (Dec.
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://optiver.com/cor
porate/hft.pdf.
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the NYSE,54 while another study of the same trading venue even suggested that “designated market makers’ attention constraints on earningsannouncement days affect the liquidity of the non-announcement stocks
they handle.”55
Overall, the existence of short-term informed trading based on some
combination of uneven distribution of information, as well as different
capabilities with respect to its acquisition, processing, and aggregation,
stale quotes, and transaction cost and speed advantages is a permanent
fixture of securities markets that is fueled by technological developments.
Furthermore, this type of trading, whether justly or unjustly called “parasitic” or “predatory,” has little to do with true insider trading and its regulation.56 Such trading activities, given the short-lived nature of the underlying information and corresponding difficulties with inventory
management, are likely to be more harmful to market makers than insider
trading, translating into a more significant adverse impact on market liquidity. Perhaps this type of trading, rather than insider trading, is primarily captured in empirical research that links better market liquidity or
smaller adverse selection costs with non-anonymity of transactions and
reputation of intermediaries or proposes an information-based explanation
for the practice of price improvements offered by market makers to se-

54

Alex Boulatov et al., Dealer Attention, the Speed of Quote Adjustment to Information, and Net Dealer Revenue, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1531, 1531 (2009).
55
Bidisha Chakrabarty & Pamela C. Moulton, Earnings Announcements and Attention Constraints: The Role of Market Design, J. ACCT. & ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357338.
56
As an illustration of the uncertain split between insider trading and informed trading in empirical research, several studies have indicated that, in certain situations, institutional investors possess information-based trading advantages, but this phenomenon is at
least partially attributable to factors other than leakages of inside information to these
market participants. See Benjamin C. Ayers & Robert N. Freeman, Evidence That Analyst
Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings, 8
REV. ACCT. STUD. 47, 63–64 (2003); Ekkehart Boehmer & Eric K. Kelley, Institutional
Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3563, 3592
(2009); Brian J. Bushee & Theodore H. Goodman, Which Institutional Investors Trade
Based on Private Information About Earnings and Returns?, 45 J. ACCT. RES. 289, 317–
18 (2007); James Jiambalvo et al., Institutional Ownership and the Extent to Which Stock
Prices Reflect Future Earnings, 19 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 117, 141 (2002); Bin Ke &
Kathy Petroni, How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence
from Their Trading Behavior Before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 895, 924–25 (2004); Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang,
Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 892, 920–21 (2009).
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lected traders.57 The distinction between insider trading and other forms of
informed trading was also recognized—explicitly or implicitly—in the
context of recent debates on various market structure issues.58 Recent
57

See Michael J. Barclay et al., Competition Among Trading Venues: Information and
Trading on Electronic Communications Networks, 58 J. FIN. 2637, 2638, 2660 (2003)
(analyzing anonymity in the context of equity trading on NASDAQ and electronic communications networks); Robert Battalio et al., Reputation Effects in Trading on the New
York Stock Exchange, 62 J. FIN. 1243, 1269–70 (2007) (analyzing reputation in the context of equity trading on the NYSE); Khoury et al., supra note 30, at 226 (analyzing price
improvement in the context of options trading on the Boston Options Exchange); Kaun
Y. Lee & Kee H. Chung, Information-Based Trading and Price Improvement, 36 J. BUS.
FIN. & ACCT. 754, 771 (2009) (analyzing price improvement in the context of equity
trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ); Erik Theissen, Trader Anonymity, Price Formation
and Liquidity, 7 EUR. FIN. REV. 1, 13, 23–24 (2003) (analyzing anonymity and price
improvement in the context of equity trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange); Louis R.
Mercorelli et al., Modeling Adverse Selection on Electronic Order-Driven Markets 35
(Mar. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1107049 (analyzing anonymity in the context of equity trading on the
Australian Stock Exchange). The link between greater anonymity and higher bid-ask
spreads was also found in commodity futures markets, in which the problem of asymmetric information is less important. See Henry L. Bryant & Michael S. Haigh, Bid-Ask
Spreads in Commodity Futures Markets, 14 APPLIED. FIN. ECON. 923, 933–35 (2004)
(data from the London International Financial Futures Exchange). However, several
empirical studies in the context of equity trading came to a different conclusion. See
Carole Comerton-Forde & Kar Mei Tang, Anonymity, Liquidity and Fragmentation, 12 J.
FIN. MKTS. 337, 338 (2009) (arguing that the introduction of anonymity on the Australian
Stock Exchange resulted in “the reduction in trading costs ... driven mainly by a reduction in the adverse selection component of the spread in large stocks”); Thierry Foucault
et al., Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?, 20 REV. FIN. STUD.
1707, 1740 (2007) (finding that the introduction of anonymity on the Paris Bourse decreased bid-ask spreads, and attributing this phenomenon to the use of volatility information by certain traders); Yusif Simaan et al., Market Maker Quotation Behavior and
Pretrade Transparency, 58 J. FIN. 1247, 1264, 1266 (2003) (suggesting that the introduction of anonymity on NASDAQ decreased bid-ask spreads by making dealer collusion
more problematic). For an additional survey of empirical literature on the link between
anonymity and market liquidity, which distinguishes between pre-trade and post-trade
anonymity, see Alexandra Hachmeister & Dirk Schiereck, Dancing in the Dark: PostTrade Anonymity, Liquidity and Informed Trading, 34 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT.
145, 147–48 (2010).
58
See Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) [hereinafter Market Structure Hearings] (statement of Daniel Mathisson, Managing Director and Head of Advanced
Execution Services, Credit Suisse) (“Who would benefit from additional quantitative
information [from ‘dark pools’] hitting the tape in real time, fundamental long-term
investors or short-term information-based traders?”); SEC’s Concept Release on Equity
Market Structure, supra note 2, at 3612 (“Liquidity providers generally consider the
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courtroom struggles also reflect tensions between market makers and
certain types of short-term traders.59 Additionally, it is possible that the
continuing existence of the practice of payment of order flow by market
makers to brokers for diverted—typically retail—orders, which was earlier
attributed to informational disadvantages of retail customers vis-à-vis
market makers,60 at least partially reflects certain advantages of short-term
traders in today’s securities markets.61
orders of individual investors very attractive to trade with because such investors are
presumed on average to not be as informed about short-term price movements as are
professional traders.”); Letter from Robert A. Bright, Chief Exec. Officer, Bright Trading
LLC, et al. to the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.sec.gov
/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-246.pdf (“When we discuss informed order flow, we are not
referring to market participants with inside information, we are referring to market participant’s orders that are on the right side of the market in the short-term.”).
59
For instance, one case addressed the conflict between options market makers and
sophisticated direct access customers and pointed to the alleged discrimination of orders
placed by direct access customers by options market makers, including interference with
execution and mishandling of such orders. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist
Partners, No. 04 C 397, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29175, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2010).
The plaintiffs themselves stated that their trading strategies were based on “information
and/or technological capabilities that are superior to that of Specialist Defendants and
other traders in the market.” Consol. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Last
Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill.
2006) (No. 04 C 397), 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 10704, at *43.
60
See, e.g., JON NAJARIAN, HOW I TRADE OPTIONS 185–86 (2001) (“[R]etail customers are looking at delayed quotes, which is a snapshot of where the market was 20 minutes ago.... Trading against someone who has a different timeframe from you can be
profitable and is how payment for order flow came into being.”). For a further discussion
of the practice of payment for order flow in the context of informational asymmetry, see
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 421 n.136. However, this practice is likely to owe its existence to a number of factors. See, e.g., Gilman
v. BHC Sec., Inc., 104 F.3d 1418, 1420, 1423 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing payment for
order flow as a “volume discount” and a “means by which the market makers compete
with one another”).
61
See Jonathan Spicer, For Wall Street, Dumb Money Pays, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/us-markets-dumb-money-idUST
RE6BG2H320101217 (discussing the practice of payment for order flow and stating that
“in contrast to high-frequency traders, retailers don’t have reams of algorithmic code and
rapid-fire trading software that often shows where stocks are headed in the next few
milliseconds”); see also Letter from Suhas Daftuar, Managing Dir., Hudson River Trading LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 8 (Apr. 30, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-171.pdf (arguing that “[t]he
existence of payment for order flow and price improvement are generally driven by OTC
market maker’s ability to discriminate among potential customers, taking the other side
of individual investor orders which, unlike orders from proprietary trading firms or institutional investors, are unlikely to have a short-term adverse impact on the liquidity provider”).
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Several empirical studies examined the impact of insider trading on liquidity of equity markets, but the results are ambiguous and contradictory.62 More generally, it is hard to isolate, identify, and measure insider
trading and its impact on market liquidity. Furthermore, analyzing specific
concealed or registered transactions by insiders has its limitations. Concealed insider trading is not necessarily detected or even suspected ex
ante, and, theoretically, there may be a long-term increase in bid-ask
spreads rather than frequent temporary increases to compensate for such
losses. Similarly, the information content of registered transactions may be
hard to separate from the noise generated by idiosyncratic liquidity needs
and individual judgments of insiders. Furthermore, this content is more
likely to convey “soft” information with a relatively long time horizon
62

See J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN.
ECON. 191, 218 (2000) (arguing that corporate policies regulating insiders’ registered
transactions decrease bid-ask spreads on the NYSE); Sugato Chakravarty & John J.
McConnell, An Analysis of Prices, Bid/Ask Spreads, and Bid and Ask Depths Surrounding Ivan Boesky’s Illegal Trading in Carnation’s Stock, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1997, at
18, 32–33 (examining illegal insider trading before a corporate acquisition and finding
unchanged bid-ask spreads and greater market depths on the NYSE); Louis Cheng et al.,
The Effects of Insider Trading on Liquidity, 14 PAC.-BASIN FIN. J. 467, 481 (2006) (examining directors’ registered transactions and arguing that they increase bid-ask spreads
and decrease market depths on the HKSE on the days when such transactions are executed); Bradford Cornell & Erik R. Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to
Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1031, 1054–55 (1992) (examining illegal insider trading
before a corporate acquisition and finding that bid-ask spreads on the NYSE in fact
decreased); Richard Frankel & Xu Li, Characteristics of a Firm’s Information Environment and the Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders, 37 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 229, 253 (2004) (finding that a higher profitability of insiders’ registered transactions is associated with increased bid-ask spreads on various trading venues); Katherine
Gleason, Does Market Maker Competition Affect the Response to Insider Trading?, 17
APPLIED FIN. ECON. 691, 699 (2007) (examining insiders’ registered transactions and
finding that they increase bid-ask spreads but do not alter market depths on NASDAQ);
Walayet A. Khan et al., The Impact of Insider Trading on Market Liquidity in the
NASDAQ Market, 21 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 11, 19 (2005) (examining insiders’ registered
transactions and finding that they decrease bid-ask spreads on NASDAQ on the days
when they are executed but suggesting that market makers still recoup their losses to
insiders through increased bid-ask spreads in the long run); Suchi Mishra et al., Spread
Behavior Around Board Meetings for Firms with Concentrated Insider Ownership, 12 J.
FIN. MKTS. 592, 594 (2009) (examining insiders’ registered transactions around board
meetings for firms with concentrated ownership and arguing that they increase bid-ask
spreads on the NYSE); Diane Del Guercio et al., An Analysis of the Price and Liquidity
Effects of Illegal Insider Trading 2 (July 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1784528 (examining illegal insider trading
on various trading venues and finding “no measurable effects [on market liquidity] as
captured by standard metrics such as quoted and effective spreads, quoted depths, and
information-based price impacts.”).
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instead of more specific bits of data relating to immediate developments.63
Thus, transactions based on this “soft” information are less likely to inflict
harm on a market maker.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISENTANGLING INFORMED TRADING,
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY, AND UNCERTAINTY
Another key issue is the necessity of disentangling informed trading,
informational asymmetry, and uncertainty. Bid-ask spreads are partly
determined by factors related to, but not requiring the existence of, informed trading. These interrelated factors include the quality and flow of
disclosure, price volatility of the security in question, and uncertainty
more generally, all of which have a direct impact on market makers’ inventory holding costs.64 Linkages among these factors and market liquidity have been suggested by several recent empirical studies,65 although
63

Recent empirical studies lead to a number of conclusions about registered transactions by insiders. See Partha Gangopadhyay et al., Profitability of Insider Trades in
Extremely Volatile Markets: Evidence from the Stock Market Crash and Recovery in
2000–2003, 48 Q.J. FIN. & ACCT. 45, 60 (2009) (documenting abnormal gains for insiders’ registered transactions and suggesting that a significant portion of such gains is
attributable to the use of private information); Adam Kolasinski & Xu Li, Are Corporate
Managers Savvy About Their Stock Price? Evidence from Insider Trading After Earnings
Announcements, 29 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 27 (2010) (examining insiders’ registered
transactions after earnings announcements and suggesting that insiders’ abnormal gains
are due to their ability to exploit market under-reaction); Lauren Cohen et al., Decoding
Insider Information 27–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16454,
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16454.pdf (arguing that an identifiable
subset of insiders’ registered transactions is information-based and predicts future news
and events for individual firms); Itzhak Ben-David & Darren Roulstone, Do Insiders Act
as Arbitrageurs? 30–32 (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://fisher.osu.edu/~roulstone_1/20090212_writeup_IRISK1.pdf (concluding that insiders’ abnormal gains from registered transactions are largely due to their
ability to exploit market mispricing of public information rather than the use of private
information).
64
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 133,
163–64.
65
See Wei-Peng Chen et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Liquidity: Analysis of
S&P Transparency and Disclosure Rankings, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE 644, 657–58
(2007) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE and better information
transparency and disclosure policies); Alex Frino & Stewart Jones, The Impact of Mandated Cash Flow Disclosure on Bid-Ask Spreads, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1373, 1373
(2005) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Australian Stock Exchange and
mandatory disclosure of cash flows); Frank L. Heflin et al., Disclosure Policy and Market
Liquidity: Impact of Depth Quotes and Order Sizes, 22 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 829, 829
(2005) (linking higher market liquidity for stocks on various trading venues, as measured
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there is a tendency to attribute these linkages to informed trading rather
than inventory holding costs. For instance, one study treated “a measure of
the disagreement in analysts’ earnings forecasts .... as a proxy for the informational disadvantage of market makers with respect to informed traders” instead of a proxy for volatility or uncertainty.66 Empirical research
that points to the correlation between greater informational advantages
enjoyed by certain equity market makers and greater market liquidity67
may also reflect other factors, such as better pricing accuracy due to decreased uncertainty, rather than the informed trading effect.68
by bid-ask spreads and market depths, and better disclosure policies); Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al., Relationship Between Analyst Forecast Properties and Equity Bid-Ask
Spreads and Depths Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements, 32 J. BUS. FIN. &
ACCT. 1773, 1797 (2005) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE and the
AMEX and lower information asymmetry, as measured by analysts’ forecast dispersion,
forecast reversion volatility, and coverage); Mark Lang et al., Transparency, Liquidity,
and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most, J. ACCT.
RES. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 37–38) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1323514 (linking lower bid-ask spreads for stocks on various trading
venues and greater transparency, as measured by the occurrence of earnings management,
quality of accounting standards, quality of auditors, analyst following, and accuracy of
analysts’ forecasts); Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, The Role of Information Asymmetry
and Financial Reporting Quality in Debt Trading: Evidence from the Secondary Loan
Market, 46 J. ACCT. & ECON. 240, 240–42 (2008) (linking lower bid-ask spreads for
syndicated loans in over-the-counter markets and conservative financial reporting and the
availability of firm-specific and loan-specific credit ratings); Haiyan Zhou, Auditing
Standards, Increased Accounting Disclosure, and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from
an Emerging Market, 26 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 584, 584 (2007) (linking lower bid-ask
spreads for stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
and additional disclosures required by new auditing standards); Siddharth Shankar et al.,
Spread Behavior and Multiple Restatement Announcements 2 (Aug. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462238
(documenting higher bid-ask spreads for stocks on the NYSE around restatement announcements).
66
Andros Gregoriou et al., Information Asymmetry and the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence
from the UK, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1801, 1801 (2005).
67
See Shantaram P. Hegde & Robert E. Miller, Market-Making in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stocks: An Empirical Analysis, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
75, 87 (1989) (data from NASDAQ in the context of underwriting activities); Simi Kedia
& Xing Zhou, Local Market Makers, Liquidity and Market Quality, 14 J. FIN. MKTS. 540,
540 (2011) (data from NASDAQ in the context of geographic proximity); Leonardo
Madureira & Shane Underwood, Information, Sell-Side Research, and Market Making,
90 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 126 (2008) (data from NASDAQ in the context of securities research); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in
Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369 (2008) (data from the NYSE, the
AMEX, and NASDAQ in the context of board representation).
68
Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 128 n.220.
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Several empirical studies attempted to link information asymmetry and
liquidity of equity markets for spinoffs and tracking stock issuances, given
a possible impact on the feasibility of different types of informed trading,
but such studies were also inconclusive and did not separate informed
trading from other similar factors.69 For instance, such structural changes
may “reduce[] uninformed investors’ uncertainty about the [firm] value,”70
which, in turn, would have an effect on the information environment.71
Thus, this group of studies also demonstrates the relevance of disentanglement.
IV. BID-ASK SPREAD DECOMPOSITION STUDIES
For estimating the impact of informed trading on different measures of
bid-ask spreads,72 the pivotal position is occupied by bid-ask spread decomposition studies.73 From the methodological perspective, a comparison
69

See John Elder et al., Do Tracking Stocks Reduce Informational Asymmetries? An
Analysis of Liquidity and Adverse Selection, 28 J. FIN. RES. 197, 211–13 (2005) (finding
that the introduction of tracking stocks is associated with a relative increase in bid-ask
spreads and a larger adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms on various trading venues); Mark R. Huson & Gregory MacKinnon, Corporate Spinoffs and
Information Asymmetry Between Investors, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 481, 501–02 (2003) (finding
higher bid-ask spreads on various trading venues after spinoffs and attributing this phenomenon to more frequent informed trading); Thomas Bates et al., Spinoffs, Spreads, and
Information Asymmetry 16–17 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at ftp://ns1.ystp.ac.ir/YSTP/1/1/ROOT/DATA/PDF/unclassified/BCSF
MA99.PDF (finding lower bid-ask spreads on the NYSE after spinoffs and attributing
this phenomenon to less frequent informed trading, although the impact on the adverse
selection component was ambiguous).
70
Michel A. Habib et al., Spinoffs and Information, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 153,
153 (1997).
71
See id. at 154.
72
For the definitions of the “quoted spread,” “effective spread,” and “realized
spread,” see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 88
n.26. Another frequently used metric, the “traded spread,” “reflects trades inside the
spread but outside the midpoint.” Roger D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, The Components of
the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 995, 1000 (1997). A less
common—and substantively different—definition of the “traded spread” is “the difference between the average price of trades at the ask side less the average price of trades at
the bid side” during a specified time period. Hans R. Stoll, Friction, 55 J. FIN. 1479, 1487
(2000). Yet another metric, the “implied spread,” captures the difference between the pretrade ask and bid prices at the same moment. Ananth Madhavan et al., Why Do Security
Prices Change? A Transaction-Level Analysis of NYSE Stocks, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 1035,
1040, 1047 (1997).
73
For a sample of empirical studies comparing various bid-ask spread decomposition
methodologies, see Bonnie F. Van Ness et al., How Well Do Adverse Selection Compo-
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of absolute or relative bid-ask spreads requires isolating different components in order to make conclusions about the impact of informed trading.
For instance, it has been argued that “[t]he substantially lesser vulnerability of stock index futures to insider information is another reason why
market spreads for futures are substantially smaller than on separate stocks
that make up the index.”74 However, while comparing different markets,
one must take into account factors that affect other components of bid-ask
spreads, such as the differences in liquidity and volatility, in addition to
the impact of other types of informed trading.
In terms of taxonomy, the three major components identified in the literature are attributed to order processing, inventory holding, and adverse
selection costs, although the inventory holding component is often omitted
and thus implicitly lumped together with the other two.75 Several studies
also presumed the existence of additional components that capture such
factors as non-competitive pricing,76 profit markup,77 market-wide buying/selling pressure, and firm-wide inventory holding costs.78 As pointed
out earlier, bid-ask spread decomposition studies have employed different
methodologies and produced a wide range of estimates for the magnitude
of the adverse selection component—even for similar methodologies and
data sets79—although one study found that such estimates under different
methodologies are highly correlated.80 This dispersion of results is also
demonstrated by the below summary of recent bid-ask spread decomposinents Measure Adverse Selection?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2001, at 77; Jonathan Clarke &
Kuldeep Shastri, On Information Asymmetry Metrics (Oct. 3, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Thomas Henker et al., The Short-Term Dynamics of Information Risk (May 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/dynamicsFMA09.pdf.
74
Merton H. Miller, International Competitiveness of U.S. Futures Exchanges, 4 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 387, 407 n.7 (1990).
75
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 149, 173
n.502.
76
See, e.g., Patrick de Fontnouvelle et al., How New Entry in Options Markets Affected Market Making and Trading Costs, J. INVESTMENT MGMT., 2d Q. 2005, at 24;
Mark Klock & D. Timothy McCormick, The Impact of Market Maker Competition on
Nasdaq Spreads, 34 FIN. REV. 55 (1999).
77
See, e.g., Eric J. Levin & Robert E. Wright, Estimating the Profit Markup Component of the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange, 44 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN. 1 (2004).
78
See, e.g., Thomas Henker & Martin Martens, Spread Decomposition with Common
Spread Components, 6 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 88 (2010).
79
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 150–62;
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity, supra note 1, at 413–17 & nn.94–
114.
80
Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 17.
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tion studies for the same trading venue, the NYSE, which are only a small
part of recent studies of this type analyzing equity securities on various
trading venues.81
Chung et al. 200482
The study uses a sample consisting of thirty-six NYSE
stocks traded from 1990 to 1991, and transactions of NYSE
specialists were separated from limit orders,83 assuming
that “the limit order spread is not likely to be determined by
market-making costs.”84
81

See, e.g., Timotheos Angelidis & Alexandros Benos, Liquidity Adjusted Value-atRisk Based on the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 16 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 835 (2006)
(data from the Athens Stock Exchange); Najah Attig et al., Effects of Large Shareholding
on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2875 (2006) (data
from the Toronto Stock Exchange); Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Managerial Bonding and
Stock Liquidity: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 117 (2004) (data
from the NYSE and the AMEX); Nicolas P.B. Bollen et al., Modeling the Bid/Ask
Spread: Measuring the Inventory-Holding Premium, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 97 (2004) (data
from NASDAQ); Charlie X. Cai et al., Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An
Empirical Analysis, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 563 (2008) (data from the LSE); Huimin
Chung, Investor Protection and the Liquidity of Cross-Listed Securities: Evidence from
the ADR Market, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1485 (2006) (data from the NYSE and
NASDAQ); Jonathan E. Clarke et al., Corporate Diversification and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Stock Market Trading Characteristics, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 105
(2004) (data from the NYSE and the AMEX); Alex Frino et al., Liquidity in Auction and
Specialist Market Structures: Evidence from the Italian Bourse, 32 J. BANKING & FIN.
2581 (2008) (data from the Italian Bourse); Maria Kasch-Haroutounian & Erik Theissen,
Competition Between Exchanges: Euronext Versus Xetra, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 181
(2009) (data from Euronext Paris and Xetra); Hung-Neng Lai, The Market Quality of
Dealer Versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of Moderately Liquid Securities, 34 J. BUS.
FIN. & ACCT. 349 (2007) (data from the LSE); Mingsheng Li et al., Asymmetric Information in the IPO Aftermarket, 40 FIN. REV. 131 (2005) (data from NASDAQ); David
Michayluk et al., What Do Options Have To Do with It?: Inclusion of Options Market
Indicators in Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition, 38 ASIA-PAC. J. FIN. STUD. 455 (2009)
(data from the Australian Stock Exchange); T. Shawn Strother et al., Electronic Communication Networks, Market Makers, and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 5 INT’L J.
MANAGERIAL FIN. 81 (2009) (data from NASDAQ); Bonnie F. Van Ness et al., The
Impact of Market Maker Concentration on Adverse-Selection Costs for Nasdaq Stocks,
28 J. FIN. RES. 461 (2005) (data from NASDAQ); Robert E. Verrecchia & Joseph Weber,
Redacted Disclosure, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 791 (2006) (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ).
82
Kee H. Chung et al., Specialists, Limit-Order Traders, and the Components of the
Bid-Ask Spread, 39 FIN. REV. 255 (2004).
83
Id. at 256–58.
84
Id. at 257.
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The study employs two different decomposition methodologies: (1) the approach applying to quoted spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order
processing components and (2) the approach applying to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection and “transitory” components.85
The estimates of the adverse selection component are as
follows: for specialist transactions, 9% of the effective
spread and 15% of the quoted spread; for specialist and
limit order transactions combined, 10% of the effective
spread and 20% of the quoted spread; and for limit order
transactions, 11% of the effective spread and 20% of the
quoted spread.86
The following explanation for the difference between specialist and limit order transactions was given: “To the extent that specialists can discriminate between informed and
uninformed orders, specialists are likely to execute lowinformation-content orders proportionately more frequently
(at better prices) than limit-order traders.... [or] let limit orders execute against high-information-content orders by not
posting their proprietary interests at times of high information asymmetry.”87
Chakravarty et al. 200588
The study uses a sample consisting of 304 decimalized
NYSE stocks and a matching sample of non-decimalized
NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in both samples traded in
2001.89

85

Id. at 260–62.
Id. at 266 tbl.5.
87
Id. at 265–67.
88
Sugato Chakravarty et al., The Effect of Decimalization on Trade Size and Adverse
Selection Costs, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1063 (2005).
89
Id. at 1065.
86

2012]

INSIDER TRADING, INFORMED TRADING

27

The study employs two different decomposition methodologies: (1) the approach applying to quoted spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order
processing components and (2) the approach applying to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection and order processing components.90
The estimates of the adverse selection component are as
follows: for the NYSE stocks before decimalization, 46%
of the quoted spread and 43% of the effective spread; for
the NYSE stocks after decimalization, 52% of the quoted
spread and 48% of the effective spread; and for the
NASDAQ stocks, from 20 to 21% of the quoted spread and
from 18 to 19% of the effective spread.91
Both decomposition methodologies indicate a large decrease of the adverse selection component in absolute terms
for the NYSE stocks and no change in absolute terms for
the NASDAQ stocks.92
Prucyk 200593
The study uses a sample consisting of thirty NYSE stocks
traded from 1993 to 1994.94
The study employs a decomposition methodology applying
to traded spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection, order processing, and inventory holding components.95
The study hypothesized that “[b]oth increases and decreases in volatility should cause an increase in the adverse selection component of the spread.”96
Depending on the magnitude of volatility changes, the adverse selection component varies from 21 to 24% of the
traded spread.97
90

Id. at 1068–71.
Id. at 1072 tbl.2.
92
Id. at 1073–74.
93
Brian Prucyk, Specialist Risk Attitudes and the Bid-Ask Spread, 40 FIN. REV. 223
(2005).
94
Id. at 228, 230–31.
95
Id. at 226–27.
96
Id. at 225.
97
Id. at 251 tbl.9.
91
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The conclusion is that “the widening in spreads and the decrease in depth [associated with changes in volatility] arises
not in response to worries about trading with betterinformed investors, but because of increased inventory
risks for the specialist.”98
Serednyakov 200599
The study uses a sample consisting of 118 NYSE stocks
and a matching sample of NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in
both samples traded in 1996, 1999, and 2002.100
The study employs a decomposition methodology applying
to traded spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection, order processing, and inventory holding components.101
Depending on the trade classification method, the estimates
of the adverse selection component of the traded spread are
53% and 77% for the NYSE stocks and 41% and 46% for
the NASDAQ stocks.102
Chen et al. 2007103
The study uses a sample consisting of every S&P 500 stock
traded in 2002 on the NYSE—424 stocks altogether.104
The study employs a decomposition methodology applying
to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order processing components.105
The adverse selection component constitutes 41% of the effective spread.106

98

Id. at 253–54.
Alexey Serednyakov, A Model of the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread (Nov.
2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=754346.
100
Id. at 17, 45 tbl.IX.
101
Id. at 2–3.
102
Id. at 45 tbl.IX.
103
Chen et al., supra note 65.
104
Id. at 648–49. However, only 341 stocks were deemed to have sufficient data for
the purposes of the study. Id. at 649.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 652 tbl.1.
99
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Jiang et al. 2009107
The study uses samples of 809, 791, and 426 pairs of
matched NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, with stocks in each
sample traded in 2001 after decimalization.108
The study employs two different decomposition methodologies: (1) the approach applying to effective spreads and
assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order
processing components and (2) the approach applying to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection and “transitory” components.109
Depending on the sample and methodology, the estimates
of the adverse selection component of the effective spread
vary from 40 to 60% for the NYSE stocks and from 6 to
10% for the NASDAQ stocks.110
Hegde et al. 2010111
The study uses a sample of eight NYSE stocks in the
NASDAQ’s dual listing program traded from 2004 to
2007.112
The study employs two different decomposition methodologies: (1) the approach applying to effective spreads and
assuming the existence of the adverse selection and order
processing components and (2) the approach applying to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse
selection and “transitory” components.113
Depending on the methodology, the estimates of the adverse selection component of the effective spread vary from
62 to 65% for the NYSE data and from 50 to 60% for the
NASDAQ data.114
107

Christine X. Jiang et al., Adverse Selection Costs for NASDAQ and NYSE After
Decimalization, 18 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 205 (2009).
108
Id. at 205–06.
109
Id. at 207, app. A, at 210–11.
110
Id. at 208 tbl.3.
111
Shantaram Hegde et al., Competitive Stock Markets: Evidence from Companies’
Dual Listings on the NYSE and NASDAQ, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 77.
112
Id. at 78.
113
Id. at 84.
114
Id. at 84 tbl.5.
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Hendershott et al. 2011115
The study uses a sample of 1082 NYSE stocks traded from
2002 to 2003 around the introduction of the “autoquote”
mechanism, considered to be a likely cause of an increase
in algorithmic trading.116
The study employs a decomposition methodology applying
to effective spreads and assuming the existence of the adverse selection and realized spread components.117
Depending on market capitalization, the estimate of the adverse selection component of the effective spread varies
from 67 to 77%.118
The study concluded that the introduction of the “autoquote” mechanism resulted in narrowed effective and
quoted spreads and attributed this change to “a sharp decline in adverse selection, or equivalently a decrease in the
amount of price discovery associated with trades.”119
Overall, estimates of the adverse selection component for the NYSE
data vary from 9 to 77%, and there is a substantial divergence, from 6 to
60%, for the NASDAQ data as well. This dispersion raises doubts about
the accuracy of bid-ask spread decomposition methodologies. Indeed, one
common proxy for the adverse selection component is a measure of the
price impact of transactions,120 but this approach ignores the blurry line
between informed trading and price discovery and makes it problematic to
isolate the contribution of inventory management-related price adjustments by market makers. Another potential complication is that “spread
decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse-selection risk

115

Terrence Hendershott et al., Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J.
FIN. 1 (2011).
116
Id. at 13–14, 16.
117
Id. at 10–11.
118
Id. at 17 tbl.I.
119
Id. at 3.
120
See, e.g., Hendrik Bessembinder & Herbert M. Kaufman, A Cross-Exchange Comparison of Execution Costs and Information Flow for NYSE-Listed Stocks, 46 J. FIN.
ECON. 293, 303 (1997); Glosten & Harris, supra note 44, at 124–25; Hendershott et al.,
supra note 115, at 11.
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when [market makers] choose depth.”121 Furthermore, one study concluded that
standard techniques applied in order to decompose bid-ask spreads into
adverse selection and other components produce spurious positive and
economically and statistically significant adverse selection component
[sic] in the world where no adverse selection exists. This finding implies that standard asymmetric information models may not actually be
testing asymmetric information.... [A]n increase in serial correlation
that is attributable to tick size reduction only but not due to a change in
adverse selection (in fact, in the absence of adverse selection) may be
mistakenly identified by a spread decomposition algorithm as being indicative of a genuine shift in adverse selection.122

Even if a given bid-ask spread decomposition methodology is reliable,
it is unclear to what extent the adverse selection component captures the
impact of insider trading, as opposed to other forms of informed trading.123 For instance, several empirical studies argued that the introduction
of derivatives, such as equity options or single stock futures, decreases
bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms for the underlying market because informed traders “migrate” to
derivatives markets,124 but this relationship is consistent with both insider
trading and other types of informed trading sensitive to leverage and
transaction costs. Furthermore, several empirical studies examining such
issues as execution speed125 and margin requirements126 are more consis121

Cecilia Caglio & Kenneth A. Kavajecz, A Specialist’s Quoted Depth as a Strategic
Choice Variable: An Application to Spread Decomposition Models, 29 J. FIN. RES. 367,
367 (2006).
122
Lynn Doran et al., Tick Size and Adverse Selection: Spurious Effects Arising from
Serial Correlation 25–26 (Mar. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1360323.
123
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 162–63.
124
See Raman Kumar et al., The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality of
the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 717, 717–19, 726 (1998)
(discussing the impact of the introduction of equity options on stocks on various trading
venues); Shastri et al., supra note 9, at 341, 348–50 (analyzing the impact of the introduction of single stock futures on stocks on the NYSE and NASDAQ). But see Petri
Sahlström, Impact of Stock Option Listings on Return and Risk Characteristics in Finland, 10 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 19, 29–32 (2001) (finding that the introduction of
equity options decreased bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Helsinki Stock Exchange but
did not change the relative size of the adverse selection component vis-à-vis the order
processing/inventory holding component).
125
See Terrence Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton, Automation, Speed, and Stock
Market Quality: The NYSE’s Hybrid, 14 J. FIN. MKTS. 568, 601 (2011) (documenting an
increase in bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute
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tent with reflecting informed trading other than insider trading. On the
other hand, given the observation that a smaller tick size leads to greater
amounts of short-term informed trading that is harmful to market makers,127 and the conjecture that “[d]ecimalization makes [it] easier and
cheaper for informed traders to break-up their large trades and jump in
front of other orders,”128 empirical evidence on the impact of decimalization on the adverse selection component is ambiguous.129
Another key issue concerns bid-ask spread decomposition studies for
data sets from markets in foreign currency, government debt, and basketand index-based securities. In these markets, the problem of asymmetric
information is less important, and the very definitions of “insider trading”
and, to some degree, “informed trading” become ambiguous.130 On the
terms for stocks on the NYSE after the introduction of a trading mechanism that substantially lowered the execution time for market orders). But see Andreas Storkenmaier &
Ryan Riordan, The Effect of Automated Trading on Market Quality: Evidence from the
New York Stock Exchange, 23 LECTURE NOTES IN BUS. INFO. PROCESSING 11, 23–24
(2009) (documenting a decrease in bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component
in relative and absolute terms after the introduction of this trading mechanism); John
Ritter, The Effect of the NYSE’s Hybrid Conversion on the Bid-Ask Spread 3 (Nov.
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting smaller quoted and
larger effective spreads after the introduction of this trading mechanism and showing that
the conclusion of whether the adverse selection component has increased or decreased
depends on the methodology); see also Ryan Riordan & Andreas Storkenmaier, Latency,
Liquidity and Price Discovery 24–25 (Mar. 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247482 (documenting smaller bidask spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms for stocks
on Xetra after the introduction of a new trading mechanism that decreased latency).
126
See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Margin Regulation and Market Quality: A Microstructure Analysis, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 549, 571 (2004) (documenting no change in bid-ask
spreads and an increase in the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms
for stocks on NASDAQ when they become margin-eligible).
127
DURBIN, supra note 17, at 94.
128
Jiang et al., supra note 107, at 205.
129
See Chakravarty et al., supra note 88, at 1079 (documenting a significant increase
of the adverse selection component and an overall decrease of adverse selection costs in
absolute terms for stocks on the NYSE after decimalization); Scott Gibson et al., The
Effect of Decimalization on the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 12 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 121, 121, 145–46 (2003) (documenting smaller bid-ask spreads for
stocks on the NYSE after decimalization, which was attributed almost entirely to a decrease of the order processing component, and hypothesizing that this result could be
attributed to the existence of non-competitive pricing).
130
See, e.g., Campbell R. Harvey & Roger D. Huang, Volatility in the Foreign Currency Futures Market, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 543, 545 (1991) (“[T]he definition of private
information and informed traders is not clear in the FX market.”); In Joon Kim et al.,
Time-Varying Bid-Ask Components of Nikkei 225 Index Futures on SIMEX, 10 PAC.BASIN FIN. J. 183, 186 (2002) (“[T]he price of stock index futures does not depend on the
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other hand, transactions on information about macroeconomic, industrywide, and other similar factors not absorbed by the market and “insidelike” information, such as the advance knowledge of an upcoming macroeconomic policy announcement, exchange-rate intervention, or issuance of government bonds, as well as order flow and inventory-related
information, certainly can and do occur. Bid-ask spread decomposition
studies for these markets have also yielded a wide range of results—even
for similar assets—and, in several instances, estimates of the adverse selection component seem too high, sometimes exceeding 100%. This variation is visible in over-the-counter foreign currency markets,131 with several
studies questioning whether asymmetric information has any influence on
liquidity in these markets.132 Markets for government securities and their
futures display an even wider range of estimates,133 although one study
idiosyncratic information of individual stocks, but it is more dependent on the economic
conditions and general stock market information .... [T]he number of well-informed
traders is far less in stock index futures markets than in stock markets.”); Toni Gravelle,
The Market Microstructure of Dealership Equity and Government Securities Markets:
How They Differ 2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs11gra_b.pdf (“It is unclear to what extent there exists private
information about the value of government securities.”).
131
See Geir Høidal Bjønnes & Dagfinn Rime, Dealer Behavior and Trading Systems
in Foreign Exchange Markets, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 571, 589, 590 tbl.6 (2005) (estimating the
adverse selection component of the effective spread, depending on the currency, from 50
to 80%); Richard Payne, Informed Trade in Spot Foreign Exchange Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 307, 321 (2003) (estimating the adverse selection
component of the effective spread at 63%); Jian Yao, Spread Components and Dealer
Profits in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market 28 (Nov. 2, 1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lyons/Yao%20
FX%20dealer%20profits.pdf (estimating the adverse selection component of the effective
spread for an average-sized transaction at 17%).
132
See, e.g., Frank McGroarty et al., The Role of Private Information in Return Volatility, Bid-Ask Spreads and Price Levels in the Foreign Exchange Market, 19 J. INT’L FIN.
MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 387, 400 (2009) (concluding that “private information
has no discernable effect on the bid-ask spread”); Carol Osler et al., Price Discovery in
Currency Markets 12 (Sch. Econ. & Mgmt., Leibniz Universität Hannover, Discussion
Paper No. 351, 2006), available at http://www.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/Forschung/Diskus
sionspapiere/dp-351.pdf (suggesting that “adverse selection has little influence over
customer spreads”).
133
See Green, supra note 42, at 1213 tbl.III (analyzing over-the-counter transactions
in U.S. government securities around economic announcements and estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread from 160 to 177%); Huang et al., supra
note 43, at 288 tbl.III (analyzing over-the-counter transactions in U.S. government securities around macroeconomic announcements and estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread from 40 to 260%); Jianxin Wang, Asymmetric Information
and the Bid-Ask Spread: An Empirical Comparison Between Automated Order Execution
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questioned the magnitude of the adverse selection component.134 Finally,
estimates for markets in basket- and index-based securities also range
widely,135 and some of these studies questioned the applicable bid-ask
and Open Outcry Auction, 9 J. INT’L FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 115, 125 tbl.3
(1999) (analyzing transactions in Australian government securities futures on the Sydney
Futures Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component of the quoted spread,
depending on the methodology and the trading platform, from 4 to 56%).
134
See Mark D. Griffiths et al., Market-Making Costs in Treasury Bills: A Benchmark
for the Cost of Liquidity, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2146, 2148 (2010) (analyzing over-thecounter transactions in U.S. government securities and concluding that “dealers do not
appear to price any asymmetric information risk at a time when the true value may be the
most uncertain”).
135
See Ahn et al., supra note 42, at 1118, 1131 (analyzing transactions in KOSPI 200
equity index options on the Korea Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component of the implied spread at 35% for call options and 39% for put options); Henk Berkman et al., A Note on Execution Costs for Stock Index Futures: Information Versus Liquidity Effects, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 565, 571 tbl.1, 573 tbl.2, 574 tbl.3 (2005)
(analyzing transactions in FTSE100 equity index futures on the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component
of the effective spread at 18%); Patricia Chelley-Steeley & Keebong Park, The Adverse
Selection Component of Exchange Traded Funds, 19 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 65, 71
(2010) (analyzing transactions in index and industry-based exchange-traded funds on
various trading venues and estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the
methodology, at 0%, with many estimates being negative, of the effective spread and
18% and 24% for index and industry-based funds, respectively, of the implied spread);
Shantaram P. Hegde & John B. McDermott, The Market Liquidity of DIAMONDS, Q’s,
and Their Underlying Stocks, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 1043, 1060 tbl.4, 1061 tbl.5 (2004)
(analyzing transactions in exchange-traded funds comprised of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average stocks on the NYSE and estimating the adverse selection component, depending
on the methodology, at 23% of the effective spread and 26% of the quoted spread); Yu
Chuan Huang, The Components of Bid-Ask Spread and Their Determinants: TAIFEX
Versus SGX-DT, 24 J. FUTURES MKTS. 835, 846 tbl.I, 855 tbl.VI (2004) (analyzing transactions in Taiwan equity index futures on the Taiwan Futures Exchange and the Singapore Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the methodology and the spread metric used, from 42 to 61% for a floor-based trading platform and
from 11 to 26% for an automated trading platform); Kim et al., supra note 130, at 194
(analyzing transactions in Nikkei 225 equity index futures on the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange and estimating the adverse selection component of the traded spread
at 4%); Wang, supra note 133, at 125 tbl.3 (1999) (analyzing transactions in SPI equity
index futures on the Sydney Futures Exchange and estimating the adverse selection
component of the quoted spread, depending on the methodology and the trading platform,
from 9 to 35%); Jonathan Clarke & Kuldeep Shastri, Adverse Selection Costs and
Closed-End Funds 31 tbl.2 (Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=256728 (analyzing transactions in various closedend funds, including equity, bond, and municipal debt-focused funds, on the NYSE and
estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the methodology, at 19% of
the implied spread and 10% of the quoted spread).
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spread decomposition methodology.136 While there are plausible explanations for the magnitude of the adverse selection component, including
reasons other than informational asymmetry,137 this dispersion of results is
more difficult to explain.
Overall, bid-ask spread decomposition studies appear unreliable at
quantifying the impact of informed trading and, of course, insider trading
more specifically. This observation may indicate either a host of methodological problems, leading to the question of whether estimates of the adverse selection component are really “noise,”138 or difficulties with defining and isolating “informed trading.”139
V. THE CONNECTION AMONG ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF
INFORMED TRADING AND BID-ASK SPREADS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
Another key area of research analyzes estimates of the probability of
informed trading (PIN).140 Several of these studies appear to lend support
136

See Robert Neal & Simon M. Wheatley, Adverse Selection and Bid-Ask Spreads:
Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 1 J. FIN. MKTS. 121, 128 tbl.1, 138, 139 tbl.5 (1998)
(analyzing transactions in shares of closed-end equity-focused funds on the NYSE and
the AMEX, estimating the adverse selection component, depending on the methodology,
at 19% of the implied spread and 52% of the quoted spread, and questioning these estimates because they are comparable to matched common stocks).
137
See Ahn et al., supra note 42, at 1143 (arguing that the magnitude of the adverse
selection component for equity index options markets “can be interpreted as evidence for
informed trading based on public information”); Bjønnes & Rime, supra note 131, at 589
(suggesting that the magnitude of the adverse selection component for foreign currency
markets is explained by their higher liquidity and lower inventory and order processing
costs); Green, supra note 42, at 1212–14 (arguing that the estimate of the adverse selection component for U.S. government securities markets exceeding 100% might be explained by dealers’ consumption of liquidity, informed trading based on public information, unobserved customer trading, and the existence of the interdealer market and
showing that the adverse selection component increases immediately after disclosure);
Huang et al., supra note 43, at 273 (arguing that the magnitude of the adverse selection
component for U.S. government securities markets “suggests trading based on superior
inventory or order flow information”); see also Clarke & Shastri, supra note 135, at 25–
26 (pointing out that the adverse selection component for closed-end funds is still lower
than for matched securities and portfolio components).
138
For several critical studies leading to this conclusion, see sources in Dolgopolov,
Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 162 n.436, 172 n.500.
139
See id. at 179.
140
This methodology for computing PIN estimates was pioneered in David Easley et
al., Liquidity, Information, and Infrequently Traded Stocks, 51 J. FIN. 1405 (1996). Several other studies used modified methodologies to obtain such estimates. See, e.g., Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading—Does Trade Misclassification Matter?, 10 J. FIN. MKTS. 26 (2007); David Jackson, Inferring Trader
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to bid-ask spread decomposition studies by pointing to the positive correlation between PIN estimates and the adverse selection component in
equity markets,141 although one study found a “surprising negative correlation” between PIN estimates and several measures of the adverse selection
component for stocks on the NYSE.142 Other studies similarly pointed to
the positive correlation between PIN estimates and bid-ask spreads in
equity markets.143 Of course, the first approach is somewhat problematic
because it links two econometric estimates rather than observed variables,
while the second approach is more objective because bid-ask spreads are
readily observable.
There is some empirical evidence in favor of PIN that passes the “it
makes sense” test,144 but several empirical studies are more difficult to
Behavior from Transaction Data: A Trade Count Model, 31 J. ECON. & FIN. 283 (2007);
Qin Lei & Guojun Wu, Time-Varying Informed and Uninformed Trading Activities, 8 J.
FIN. MKTS. 153 (2005); Ken Nyholm, Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading, 25
J. FIN. RES. 485 (2002); Syed Walid Reza & Craig A. Wilson, Does Corporate Ownership Impact the Probability of Informed Trading?, 7 INT’L J. BUS. RES. 188 (2007);
Anthony Tay et al., Using High-Frequency Transaction Data to Estimate the Probability
of Informed Trading, 7 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 288 (2009); David Easley et al., Flow
Toxicity and Volatility in a High Frequency World (Cornell Univ., Johnson Sch. Research Paper No. 09-2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695596; Yuxing
Yan, A New Method to Estimate PIN (Probability of Informed Trading) (Mar. 17, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1361921.
141
See, e.g., Kee H. Chung & Mingsheng Li, Adverse-Selection Costs and the Probability of Information-Based Trading, 38 FIN. REV. 257, 262, 270 (2003) (data from the
NYSE); Joachim Grammig et al., Knowing Me, Knowing You: Trader Anonymity and
Informed Trading in Parallel Markets, 4 J. FIN. MKTS. 385, 385, 408 (2001) (data from
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange); Jackson, supra note 140, at 294–95 (data from the
NYSE); Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready, Credit Ratings and Stock Liquidity, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 119, 131, 138 tbl.5 (2006) (data from the NYSE).
142
Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 17–18.
143
See, e.g., Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Informed and Uninformed Trading
in an Electronic, Order-Driven Environment, 35 FIN. REV. 125, 125, 145 (2000) (data
from the HKSE); David Easley et al., Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades, 6 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171, 173, 179 (2008) (data from the NYSE);
Hans G. Heidle & Robert D. Huang, Information-Based Trading in Dealer and Auction
Markets: An Analysis of Exchange Listings, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 391,
416–17 (2002) (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ); Jackson, supra note
140, at 294 (data from the NYSE); Lei & Wu, supra note 140, at 177 (data from the
NYSE); Odders-White & Ready, supra note 141, at 138 tbl.5 (data from the NYSE);
Clara Vega, Stock Price Reaction to Public and Private Information, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
103, 128 (2006) (data from various trading venues).
144
See, e.g., Stephen Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, How Disclosure Quality Affects
the Level of Information Asymmetry, 12 REV. ACCT. STUD. 443, 444 (2007) (finding a
negative correlation between the quality of disclosure and PIN estimates for stocks on
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interpret.145 Another perspective is whether PIN is a meaningful concept
that is priced in equity markets.146 Furthermore, there are doubts whether
various trading venues); Jinghan Cai et al., How Better Informed Are the Institutional
Investors?, 106 ECON. LETTERS 234, 237 (2010) (finding that PIN estimates are significantly higher for institutional trades compared to retail trades for stocks on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange); Juan J. Cruces & Enrique Kawamura, Insider Trading and Corporate
Governance in Latin America, in INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE ACROSS LATIN AMERICA 85, 129 (Alberto Chong & Florencio
López-de-Silanes eds., 2007) (finding increased PIN estimates before certain types of
announcements for stocks on various trading venues); Vanthuan Nguyen et al., InterMarket Competition for Exchange Traded Funds, 31 J. ECON. & FIN. 251, 258 (2007)
(finding that PIN estimates for exchange-traded funds on various trading venues are
significantly lower compared to component securities); Hadiye Aslan et al., Firm Characteristics and Informed Trading: Implications for Asset Pricing 14–15 (Sept. 1, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1334465 (finding reasonable correlations between PIN estimates and such variables as
insider holdings, accounting accruals, volatility, and firm size for stocks on the NYSE
and the AMEX).
145
See, e.g., Nihat Aktas et al., The PIN Anomaly Around M&A Announcements, 10 J.
FIN. MKTS. 169, 170–71, 189 (2007) (finding that PIN estimates decrease before M&A
announcements and increase after such announcements for stocks on Euronext Paris);
Evangelos Benos & Marek Jochec, Testing the PIN Variable 1 (Mar. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.business.uiuc.edu/fin
ance/phd/pdf/5299.pdf (finding that PIN estimates before earnings announcements are
slightly lower than estimates after such announcements for stocks on the NYSE); Clarke
& Shastri, supra note 135, at 16 (finding that non-municipal bond funds on the NYSE
have PIN estimates comparable to individual stocks).
146
See Laurence Copeland et al., Information-Based Trade in the Shanghai Stock
Market, 20 GLOBAL FIN. J. 180, 180 (2009) (concluding that PIN is priced on the Shanghai Stock Exchange but finding that some of its effect is indistinguishable from the turnover effect); Malay K. Dey, Is Information Risk Really a Determinant of Security Returns? Evidence from TORQ, J. TRADING, Summer 2010, at 51, 51 (concluding that PIN
is not priced on the NYSE); Jefferson Duarte & Lance Young, Why Is PIN Priced?, 91 J.
FIN. ECON. 119, 119 (2009) (concluding that PIN is priced on the NYSE and the AMEX
to the extent it reflects illiquidity rather than informational asymmetry); David Easley et
al., Factoring Information into Returns, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 293, 308
(2010) (finding evidence consistent with the view that PIN is priced on the NYSE and the
AMEX but also considering the possibility that PIN is a proxy for another underlying
factor); David Easley et al., Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?, 57 J.
FIN. 2185, 2218–19 (2002) (concluding that PIN is priced on the NYSE); Kathleen P.
Fuller et al., Is Information Risk Priced for NASDAQ-Listed Stocks?, 34 REV.
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 301, 310–11 (2010) (concluding that PIN is only weakly
priced on NASDAQ and likely to be a proxy for other variables); Partha Mohanram &
Shiva Rajgopal, Is PIN Priced Risk?, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 226, 241 (2009) (concluding
that PIN is not priced on the NYSE and the AMEX); Y.C. Lu & Woon K. Wong, Probability of Information-Based Trading as a Pricing Factor in Taiwan Stock Market 16
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1115419 (concluding that PIN is priced on the Taiwan Stock Exchange).
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PIN captures—or is highly sensitive to changes in—insider trading rather
than informed trading that reflects inherent differences in acquiring,
processing, and aggregating information, as well as other similar factors:
PIN is likely to be most highly correlated with information asymmetries that exist between groups of outside investors rather than asymmetries that exist between insiders and outside investors. As a result, it is
possible that PIN is computed mainly from observations of one kind of
information asymmetry while insider trading is purely due to a second
kind.147

Another study linked a decrease in the tick size with higher PIN estimates for stocks on the NYSE,148 which is also consistent with an increase
in short-term informed trading.149 The skepticism that insider trading constitutes the bulk of informed trading captured by PIN estimates is reinforced by the fact that such estimates for individual stocks often seem to
be quite high, although several methodological approaches yield lower
estimates.150 An additional consideration is the detection of relatively large
PIN estimates in a variety of markets in assets other than equities or equity
options.151 Furthermore, one study analyzed the “flash crash” of May 6,
147

Steven J. Huddart & Bin Ke, Information Asymmetry and Cross-Sectional Variation in Insider Trading, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 195, 219 (2007).
148
Xin Zhao & Kee H. Chung, Decimal Pricing and Information-Based Trading: Tick
Size and Informational Efficiency of Asset Price, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 753, 764
(2006).
149
See DURBIN, supra note 17, at 93–94.
150
See, e.g., Brockman & Chung, supra note 143, at 132, 137 (a mean value of 33%
for a sample of 532 stocks on the HKSE); Kee H. Chung et al., Order Preferencing,
Adverse-Selection Costs, and the Probability of Information-Based Trading, 27 REV.
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 343, 346, 353 tbl.3 (2006) (mean values of 27% and 30%
for two different samples of 3032 and 2983 stocks on NASDAQ); Chung & Li, supra
note 141, at 263 tbl.1 (a mean value of 14% for a sample of 538 stocks on the NYSE);
Dey, supra note 146, at 53, 55 (a mean value of 21% for a sample of 65 stocks on the
NYSE); Easley et al., supra note 143, at 179, 190 tbl.4 (a mean value of 14% for a sample of 16 stocks on the NYSE); Jackson, supra note 140, at 292 tbl.2 (mean values of
19% and 23%, depending on the methodology, for a sample of 90 stocks on the NYSE);
Lei & Wu, supra note 140, at 162, 165 tbl.2 (a mean value of 23% for a sample of 40
stocks on the NYSE); Reza & Wilson, supra note 140, at 194, 208 tbl.12 (a mean value
ranging from 9 to 11%, depending on the subsample, for a sample of 73 stocks on the
NYSE and the AMEX); Yan, supra note 140, at 50 tbl.9 (mean values of 7% and 20%,
depending on the methodology, for a sample of 90 stocks on the NYSE).
151
See, e.g., Julien Idier & Stefano Nardelli, Probability of Informed Trading on the
Euro Overnight Market Rate, 16 INT’L J. FIN. & ECON. 131, 139 (2011) (a mean value of
45% for over-the-counter interest rate markets); Haitao Li et al., Are Liquidity and Information Risks Priced in the Treasury Bond Market?, 64 J. FIN. 467, 484 tbl.III (2009) (a
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2010, which was a system-wide phenomenon, and found that one of the
PIN metrics for E-mini S&P 500 futures “was abnormally high at least one
week before the flash crash [and] reached its highest level in the history of
the E-mini S&P 500 [shortly before the crash].”152
Another direction in empirical research specifically links PIN estimates in equity markets and insider trading, although one of these studies
explicitly recognized that PIN “provides estimates of privately informed
trading, which is more general and not necessarily restricted to illegal
insider trading.”153 Several studies examined correlations among PIN
estimates and various corporate governance characteristics, such as CEO
compensation, director ownership, the existence of an outside board chairperson, and ownership concentration,154 with some of them having a
plausible connection to insider trading. One study even tied higher scores
for an index measuring the quality of corporate governance to lower PIN
estimates on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ.155 It is, however,
problematic to make any definite conclusions based on such imprecise
proxies. This limitation is also relevant for a study that linked PIN estimean value of 26% for over-the-counter government securities markets); Clarke & Shastri, supra note 135, at 31 tbl.2 (a mean value ranging from 15 to 19% for various equityand debt-focused closed-end funds on the NYSE); Ramazan Gen ay et al., When Do
Informed Traders Arrive in Foreign Exchange Markets? 13 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://economics.ca/2008/papers/0027.pdf
(a mean value of 12% for over-the-counter foreign currency markets); Ian W. Marsh &
Ceire O’Rourke, Customer Order Flow and Exchange Rate Movements: Is There Really
Information Content? 18 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=704944 (a mean value of 31% for over-the-counter
foreign currency markets); Clara Vega & Jin (Ginger) Wu, Stock Market Microstructure
Measures of Information Asymmetry Are Related to Marketwide Information 26 tbl.1A
(Dec. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=951491 (a mean value ranging from 12 to 14%, depending on maturity, for
over-the-counter government securities markets).
152
David Easley et al., The Microstructure of the “Flash Crash”: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes, and the Probability of Informed Trading, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter
2011, at 118, 122. One researcher criticized this methodology and asserted that, “the flash
crash reveals a key weakness of the PIN measure in that it overlooks the possibility of
order imbalances induced by firm-specific or market-wide liquidity shocks.” Qin Lei,
Unveiling the Identity of PIN from the Flash Crash: Illiquidity or Information Asymmetry? 1, 14 (Aug. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697879.
153
Cruces & Kawamura, supra note 144, at 128.
154
See id. at 108–13 (data from various trading venues); David Jackson et al., Corporate Governance and Informed Trading, 4 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 295, 308 tbl.II
(2008) (data from the Toronto Stock Exchange).
155
Kee H. Chung et al., Corporate Governance and Liquidity, 45 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 265, 265 (2010).
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mates on the NYSE and the AMEX and various firm-specific financial
indicators and ratios, and concluded that such estimates are most influenced by asset turnover and dividend yields.156 One contribution found no
correlation between PIN estimates on the NYSE and insiders’ registered
transactions and argued that this result “casts some doubt on the validity of
[the PIN] measure.”157 By contrast, another study pointed to a positive
correlation between PIN estimates on the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ, and the percentage of insider ownership.158
A different approach to linking insider trading and PIN estimates in
equity markets focuses on regulation. One cross-country study examined
key features of insider trading regulation and found negative correlations
among PIN estimates and the maximum incarceration sentence allowed by
law and the potential strength of pecuniary sanctions.159 However, it failed
to identify any significant correlations with respect to the existence of
potential criminal sanctions, the actual existence of civil and criminal
enforcement, the strength of the public regulator, and the availability of
private right of action.160 Another contribution evaluated the impact of a
piece of legislation in New Zealand that had implemented a continuous
disclosure regime, established a powerful regulatory agency to oversee
securities markets and enforce insider trading restrictions, and required
insiders to disclose their transactions within five trading days, but this
extensive regulatory framework was found to have no significant effect on
PIN estimates.161 A related study examined PIN estimates on the weakly
regulated Prague Stock Exchange and concluded that their mean values
ranged from 0 to 2%, depending on the subsample, and thus were much
lower compared to more regulated markets, although this counterintuitive
result could be justified by the specifics of the trading mechanism and the
existence of off-exchange informed transactions.162 By contrast, a later
156

Chuan Liao et al., Firm Characteristics and Information Risk, JASSA, no. 2, 2010,
at 41, 43, 46–47.
157
Clarke & Shastri, supra note 73, at 23.
158
Patrick J. Dennis & James P. Weston, Who’s Informed?: An Analysis of Stock
Ownership and Informed Trading 2–3 (Sept. 25, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
159
Bart Frijns et al., Elements of Effective Insider Trading Laws 8, 35 tbl.6 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.fma.org/Texas
/Papers/ElementsInsiderTrading.pdf.
160
Id. at 8–9, 35 tbl.6, 37 tbl.7.
161
Russell Poskitt & Peihong Yang, The Impact of Disclosure Reform on Information
Risk in NZX-Listed Stocks, 18 PAC. ACCT. REV. 47, 47, 50–51 (2006).
162
Libor N!me"ek, Liquidity and Information-Based Trading on the Order Driven
Capital Market: The Case of the Prague Stock Exchange 16–17 (Aug. 25, 1997) (unpub-
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study of the same trading venue found that the mean value of PIN estimates is 32%, which is at least as large as in more regulated markets.163
An additional study analyzed PIN estimates for companies in Latin America, a region in which “illegal insider trading goes unpunished,”164 but the
median estimates of 11% for the most liquid stocks and 20% for the least
liquid stocks are comparable to more regulated markets.165 A similar investigation focused on PIN estimates in Chinese securities markets, in
which insider trading is also common and weakly controlled,166 but the
obtained mean value of 21% is similarly comparable to more regulated
markets.167 Yet another China-focused study calculated mean PIN estimates for institutional and individual trades at 24% and 17%, respectively.168 One potential explanation for the seeming irrelevance of regulation
is that insider trading is only a small part of informed trading captured by
PIN estimates.
Overall, the totality of the existing empirical research suggests that the
PIN-related studies do not offer clear and consistent evidence to link informed trading and market liquidity because of a variety of conceptual,
methodological, and measurement problems. The link between PIN estimates and insider trading is also suspect.
VI. VARIOUS MECHANISMS FOR PROVIDING LIQUIDITY
A separate area of research on the link between informed trading and
market liquidity pertains to the impact of various mechanisms for providing liquidity. One common approach is to compare bid-ask spreads and
their components for similar equity securities on dealer and auction markets, typically the NYSE and NASDAQ.169 Although several theoretical
approaches predict why market makers on a certain trading venue might
be more vulnerable to informed trading, actual results of empirical re-

lished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/pdf/wp
/Wp117.pdf.
163
Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera, Information-Driven Trading at the Prague
Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra-Day Data, 10 ECON. TRANSITION 747, 758 (2002).
164
Cruces & Kawamura, supra note 144, at 128.
165
See id. at 128–29.
166
Weihua Zhu, Corporate Governance and Insider Trading Regulation Efficiency, 4
FRONTIERS BUS. RES. CHINA 306, 307 (2010).
167
See id. at 313 tbl.1.
168
Cai, supra note 144, at 237.
169
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 122–25
& nn.193–206.
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search have not yielded a consistent answer.170 Recent comparative studies
indicate that the adverse selection component is higher for the NYSE than
for NASDAQ, although the magnitude of the inter-market difference varies across these studies.171 Furthermore, one must take into account the
rapid evolution of both types of markets and their convergence, as well as
possible systemic differences in other components of bid-ask spreads.
Another direction in empirical research examines the introduction of
designated market makers in equity markets, which often have exchangegranted incentives to provide liquidity. Several studies concluded that the
introduction of such market participants had decreased bid-ask spreads
without an impact on the adverse selection component in absolute terms
on Euronext Amsterdam172 and Xetra.173 If the existence of designated
market makers aids the detection of informed trading,174 these results look
puzzling, although technological and other market structure changes must
be taken into account. A different study analyzed the introduction of designated market makers on the Italian Stock Exchange and found lower
bid-ask spreads and adverse selection costs, as well as lower volatility.175
However, such market makers had undertaken the obligation to function
as de facto securities analysts,176 and the study ultimately concluded that
“the decrease in information asymmetries observed ... is due to an improvement in the degree of information disclosure.”177
Yet another angle is the examination of trading venues without formal
market makers, such as markets that function as open limit order books or

170

Id.
See Charkavarty et al., supra note 88, at 1071–73 tbl.2; Jiang et al., supra note
107, at 208 tbl.3; Serednyakov, supra note 99, at 45 tbl.IX.
172
Albert J. Menkveld & Ting Wang, How Do Designated Market Makers Create
Value for Small-Caps? 31–33 (Jan. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890526.
173
Inga van den Bongard & Jördis Klar, Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread and the
Role of Designated Sponsors: Evidence for Xetra 22–23 (Oct. 5, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.socialpolitik.de/tagungshps
/2007/paper/Klar.pdf; Jördis Hengelbrock, Designated Sponsors and Bid-Ask Spreads on
Xetra 23–24 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1046961.
174
For a discussion of this proposition in the context of the specialist system in auction markets, see Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at
122–23 & nn.193–95 & 198–200.
175
Pietro Perotti & Barbara Rindi, Market Makers as Information Providers: The
Natural Experiment of STAR, 17 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 895, 914–15 (2010).
176
Id. at 897, 915.
177
Id. at 915.
171
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aggregate market and limit orders.178 This model, which has a long history,179 is acquiring importance even outside of equity markets.180 Although
the existence of de facto market makers without specific exchange-granted
advantages is not necessarily precluded for such trading venues,181 there
might be industry norms or regulatory restrictions to that effect.182 Even
putting aside the existence of de facto market makers, one formal model
concluded that bid-ask spreads in an open limit order book market should
reflect the cost of informed trading.183 However, it is debatable whether
the risk of trading with a better-informed counterparty is of real significance to a random trader compared to a trader regularly transacting in both
directions.184 Several empirical studies analyzed the magnitude of the
178

The vision of trading venues without the pivotal importance of traditional market
makers was clearly articulated in Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange (pts. 1 & 2), FIN. ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 1971, at 28, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–
Dec. 1971, at 24. For a later analysis of this issue by the same author, see Fischer Black,
Equilibrium Exchanges, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1995, at 23.
179
For instance, a commission formed to study the LSE recommended back in 1878
that “a book or register should be kept ... in which brokers should be invited to enter from
time to time the names and quantities of [certain illiquid] securities ... which they may
have instructions to buy or sell, with or without a price at which they are willing to
deal.... [thus achieving] the exclusion of the middleman.” LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, 1878, [C. (2d series)] 2157, at 10.
180
See, e.g., ANDY NYBO, TABB GRP., TRYING TO MAKE CHANGE: MARKET MAKERS
AND THE EVOLVING OPTIONS MARKET 1 (2008) (“Slowly but surely, options trading is
transitioning from a quote-driven market where liquidity is provided by market makers,
to an order-driven market with liquidity being provided by natural market participants.”).
181
See, e.g., Brockman & Chung, supra note 143, at 128 (“Although there are no
market makers with an affirmative obligation to trade in an order-driven environment, de
facto market makers on the [HKSE, an open limit order book market] are likely to provide liquidity in much the same fashion as ‘scalpers’ on floor-based futures exchanges.”).
182
See, e.g., G.-F. Gu et al., Quantifying Bid-Ask Spreads in the Chinese Stock Market
Using Limit-Order Book Data, 57 EUR. PHYSICS J. B 81, 82 (2007) (“In order to reduce
the market risks and speculation actions, the Chinese stock market adopts t+1 trading
system, which does not allow traders to sell the stocks bought on the same day ....”);
Yasushi Hamao & Joel Hasbrouck, Securities Trading in the Absence of Dealers: Trades
and Quotes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 8 REV. FIN. STUD. 849, 850 (1995) (“[B]y
custom and convention, members [of the Tokyo Stock Exchange] refrain from placing
proprietary limit orders on both sides of the market.... [which] effectively prevents a
group of traders that would naturally gravitate toward functioning as de facto dealers
from doing so.”).
183
Lawrence G. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, 49 J.
FIN. 1127, 1140 (1994).
184
Some evidence on this issue is presented by empirical research finding a negative
correlation between bid-ask spreads in equity markets and disclosure quality for trading
venues without formal market makers. See Andrea Maria Accioly Fonseca Minardi et al.,
Bid-Ask Spreads in a Stock Exchange Without Market Specialists, 7 LATIN AM. BUS.
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adverse selection component for stocks on trading venues without formal
market makers and found this component to be relatively large.185 Another
study argued that “the price impact measure and the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread” for stocks in the open limit order book
markets in China “explain[] 44% and 46% of the variation in [foreign-held
equity] discounts.”186 These results may seem surprising, but the ambiguities of the definition of “informed trading” and other limitations of bid-ask
spread decomposition methodologies must be taken into account.

REV. 19, 33–34 (2006) (data from the São Paulo Stock Exchange); Frino & Jones, supra
note 65, at 1393 (data from the Australian Stock Exchange); Zhou, supra note 65, at 615–
16 (data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). It is
debatable whether this phenomenon can be attributed—at least partially—to inventory
holding costs rather than adverse selection costs for trading venues in which even de
facto market makers do not exist. Compare Chengying He et al., Adverse Selection Costs:
A Study on the Chinese Stock Market, 4 FRONTIERS BUS. RES. CHINA 209, 222 (2010)
(“[A]n investor who submitted limit orders acts as an implied market maker .... [T]he
theory of inventory holding costs can be used in order-driven market, based on the view
that limited orders absorb the inventory passively according to the instructions (orders)
from the market in exchange for price reverse.”) (citation omitted), with Zhou, supra note
65, at 591 n.12 (“[T]here is no requirement for dealers to hold a certain level of inventory
to meet demand immediately, and hence, no inventory holding cost in an order-driven
market.”).
185
Hee-Joon Ahn et al., The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread in a Limit-Order
Market: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 9 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 399, 411, 412
tbl.4 (2002) (estimating the adverse selection component of the implied spread on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange, a trading venue that aggregates market and limit orders, from 45
to 57%, depending on the share price); Paul Brockman & Dennis Y. Chung, Bid-Ask
Spread Components in an Order-Driven Environment, 22 J. FIN. RES. 227, 237–40
(1999) (estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the HKSE,
a limit order book, at 33%); Frank de Jong et al., Price Effects of Trading and Components of the Bid-Ask Spread on the Paris Bourse, 3 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 193, 200–01 (1996)
(estimating the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the Paris Bourse, a
trading venue that aggregates market and limit orders, from 30 to 45%, depending on the
trade size); He et al., supra note 184, at 219–20 tbl.3 (estimating the adverse selection
component of the effective spread on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, an open limit order
book, from 2 to 43% of the effective spread, depending on the bid-ask spread decomposition methodology, firm size, and order size); Zhou, supra note 65, at 600 tbl.3 (estimating
the adverse selection component of the effective spread on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, open limit order books, at 37%). None of these studies isolated the inventory holding component, and one of them explicitly recognized this
methodological limitation. He et al., supra note 184, at 228–29. From the measurement
perspective, it is argued that, “there is no essential difference between effective spread
and quoted spread in order-driven markets.” Zhou, supra note 65, at 593 n.14.
186
Kalok Chan et al., Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the
China Foreign Share Discount, 63 J. FIN. 159, 159 (2008).
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VII. THE EXAMINATION OF UNREGULATED SECURITIES MARKETS
AND THE IMPACT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION ON MARKET
LIQUIDITY
Another avenue for examining the link between informed trading and
bid-ask spreads includes historical experiences of unregulated securities
markets and the impact of insider trading regulation, including various
cross-country studies. However, one methodological complication is that
many studies are not easily comparable.
A separate category of research brings together studies of historical
experiences of unregulated securities markets—although there is little
direct evidence that insider trading was of concern to equity market makers and thus had an adverse impact on market liquidity. One study analyzed stocks on the Berlin Stock Exchange in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and concluded that, in this active securities market,
“trading costs were low ... in the decades before World War I, even by
modern US standards and certainly by recent German standards.”187 Puzzled by this result, the study hypothesized that “the Berlin banks may have
intervened in price determination as informed market makers and thereby
reduced adverse selection costs.”188 A related study of the NYSE argued
that the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads for a representative sample of common stocks increased from 49% in 1900 to 69% in
1910 in relative terms, corresponding to a 114% increase in absolute
terms.189 However, there were improvements in other measures of market
liquidity during the same time period,190 and the estimates of the adverse
selection component displayed several inconsistencies when broken down
by subgroups.191 The study also concluded that “trading costs and measures of illiquidity for the most heavily traded securities compare quite
187

Thomas Gehrig & Caroline Fohlin, Trading Costs in Early Securities Markets: The
Case of the Berlin Stock Exchange 1880–1910, 10 REV. FIN. 587, 589–90 (2006). Another study also came to a similar conclusion, but it still argued that “[l]iquidity was negatively correlated with active informed trading.” Carsten Burhop & Sergey Gelman, Liquidity Measures, Liquidity Drivers and Expected Returns on an Early Call Auction
Market 1 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_19online.pdf.
188
Gehrig & Fohlin, supra note 187, at 610.
189
Caroline Fohlin et al., Liquidity and Competition in Unregulated Markets: The
New York Stock Exchange Before the SEC 1, 45 tbl.4 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://www.iga.ucdavis.edu/Research/All-UC
/conferences/spring-2010/Fohlin%20paper.PDF.
190
Id. at 19–20.
191
See id. at 23–24, 45 tbl.4.
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closely with modern-day rates in well-developed markets”192—despite the
lack of insider trading regulation.193
A different category of empirical research consists of studies of modern securities markets that lack regulatory norms or stringent enforcement.
One study focused on the Prague Stock Exchange, a market in which insider trading is common.194 This study concluded that the adverse selection component of the effective spread for stocks averages at 17%, which
is quite low compared to more regulated markets.195 A study of the Ukrainian stock market during the time period when this trading venue had no
formal market makers estimated the adverse selection component of the
traded spread at 10%196—despite the industry opinion that “insider trading
is unfortunately a permanent feature of the Ukrainian stock market.”197
Furthermore, the magnitude of the adverse selection component was statistically insignificant for 50% of stocks in the sample, although this result
might have been caused by the data’s insufficiency.198 One justification
for the results produced by these two studies could be that more regulated
markets possess more developed financial infrastructure, which may mean
greater amounts of other types of informed trading.
Another direction in empirical research studies the impact of insider
trading regulation on liquidity of equity markets. One contribution focused
on the two key laws aimed at insider trading in the United States and documented that they were associated with a decrease in bid-ask spreads on
NASDAQ, but their impact on the adverse selection component was ambiguous.199 One more U.S.-centered study found a decrease in bid-ask
spreads and the adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms
on various trading venues after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
192

Id. at 32.
See id. at 4 (noting “the absence of regulation regarding insider trading” during the
applicable time period).
194
Jan Hanousek & Richard Podpiera, Informed Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread:
Evidence from an Emerging Market, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 275 (2003).
195
Id. at 295.
196
Yuriy Ryzhkov, Bid-Ask Spread Components: Evidence from PFTS (First Ukrainian Trading System) 29 (2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, National University of “KyivMohyla Academy”) (on file with author), available at http://www.kse.org.ua/uploads/file
/library/2007/ryzhkov_2007.pdf. This study also found “almost no econometric evidence
of inventory holding costs.” Id. at 26.
197
Id. at 11.
198
Id. at 27.
199
Vaughn S. Armstrong, The Microstructure of Informed Trading: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading Sanctions iii, 135–36, 159 (May 1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with author).
193
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related regulation.200 Another study analyzed the impact of an omnibus
securities law passed in New Zealand that had several insider tradingrelated provisions and concluded that this law had no impact on the adverse selection component in either relative or absolute terms.201 By contrast, a study examining the impact of the same piece of legislation found
smaller bid-ask spreads,202 although the implementation of a continuous
disclosure regime203 might be responsible for this result. A different analysis of this piece of legislation found a decrease in bid-ask spreads and the
adverse selection component in relative and absolute terms.204
An additional case study considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) that banned selective disclosure of certain types of information to favored investors and securities analysts.205 Empirical studies
present evidence—often from different data sets—consistent with a range
of views about the effectiveness and the overall effect of Reg FD, which
could have impacted bid-ask spreads and their components in a variety of
ways. For example, there is a debate whether this regulation has achieved
its ultimate objectives,206 and some recent anecdotal evidence suggests
200

Pankaj K. Jain et al., Trends and Determinants of Market Liquidity in the Pre- and
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Periods 26–27, 34 tbl.2 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=488142; see also Francois
Brochet, Information Content of Insider Trades Before and After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
85 ACCT. REV. 419, 419 (2010) (presenting empirical evidence from various trading
venues, which is based on market reaction to certain filings, consistent with the view that
“SOX and regulatory actions [have] reduc[ed] the incentives to sell ahead of privately
known negative news”).
201
Poskitt & Yang, supra note 161, at 47, 63.
202
Gilbert et al., supra note 5, at 748.
203
See Poskitt & Yang, supra note 161, at 50.
204
Bart Frijns et al., Insider Trading, Regulation, and the Components of the Bid-Ask
Spread, 31 J. FIN. RES. 225, 225, 232, 233 tbl.1 (2008).
205
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243).
206
See Anwer S. Ahmed & Richard A. Schneible Jr., The Impact of Regulation Fair
Disclosure on Investors’ Prior Information Quality—Evidence from an Analysis of
Changes in Trading Volume and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings Announcements, 13 J.
CORP. FIN. 282, 297 (2007) (“[Reg] FD succeeded in eliminating selective disclosure [for
firms on various trading venues].”); Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana et al., The Impact of
Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis, 39 FIN. REV. 549, 552 (2004) (“[T]he [post-Reg FD] decline in information asymmetry in the pre-announcement period [for firms on the NYSE] is closely associated with
lower institutional trading.”); Charles D. Collver, Is There Less Informed Trading After
Regulation Fair Disclosure?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 270, 279 (2007) (“[I]nformed trading
declined after implementation of Reg FD [on the NYSE], but ... this decline is not due to
Reg FD.”); Andreas Gintschel & Stanimir Markov, The Effectiveness of Regulation FD,
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that Reg FD has merely shifted, rather than eliminated, at least some part
of insider trading activities.207 Other aspects of empirical research focus
on the impact of this regulation—often with different conclusions—on the
informational environment,208 volatility,209 and cost of capital210 as a
37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 293, 312–13 (2004) (“Reg FD achiev[ed] its immediate goal of
curtailing the flow of private information from managers to financial analysts.... [as
measured by] the price impact of analyst announcements in the post-Reg FD period [for
firms on various trading venues] ....”); Bin Ke et al., The Effect of Regulation FD on
Transient Institutional Investors’ Trading Behavior, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 853, 853 (2008)
(“Reg FD has had an impact on management’s selective disclosure behavior and significantly changed the trading behavior of transient institutions [on various trading venues].”); Robert B. Mendelson et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and Volatility: An
Intraday Analysis, J. INVESTMENT MGMT., 3d Q. 2005, at 31, 32 (“Reg FD has been
successful in its goal of reducing information asymmetry in the market [as measured by
various variables, such as volatility, share volume, number of transactions, bid-ask
spreads, and average trade size on the NYSE].”).
207
See Gregory Zuckerman & Susan Pulliam, The Insider-Trading Case: How an
SEC Crackdown Led to Rise of ‘Expert Networks,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, at C1.
208
See Ahmed & Schneible, supra note 206, at 297 (“[Reg FD resulted in] a decrease
in the average quality of information [about small and high-tech firms on various trading
venues] ....”); Brian J. Bushee et al., Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure
Regulation: The Case of Reg FD and Conference Calls, 79 ACCT. REV. 617, 617 (2004)
(“[There seems to be no] evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information
disclosed during the call period [for firms on various trading venues] ....”); Afshad J.
Irani & Irene Karamanou, Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst
Forecast Dispersion, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 15, 15 (2003) (“[Reg FD is associated with] a
decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion [for firms on various
trading venues] ....”); Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag & Kenneth Small, The Impact of
Regulation Fair Disclosure on Earnings Management and Analyst Forecast Bias, 31 J.
ECON. & FIN. 87, 97 (2007) (“[A]nalyst forecast accuracy has deteriorated in the post-FD
period.... [and] analysts tend, on average, to overestimate earnings more in the post-FD
period [for firms on various trading venues].”); Yan Sun, How Does Regulation Fair
Disclosure Affect Pre-Fair Disclosure Selective Disclosers?, 24 J. ACCT. AUDITING &
FIN. 59, 61 (2009) (“Reg FD is associated with a deterioration in the information environment for firms [on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ] that relied on selective
disclosures before the passage of the regulation [as measured by various variables, such
as analyst following, analysts’ forecast error and dispersion, and informational efficiency
of stock prices].”); Carla Carnaghan & Ranjini Sivakumar, The Effects of Regulation Fair
Disclosure on Management Forecasts, at i (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=492662 (“[I]nformation disclosed by managers has improved in terms of frequency, specificity and verifiable information provided
[for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ].”).
209
See Warren Bailey et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and Earnings Information:
Market, Analyst, and Corporate Responses, 58 J. FIN. 2487, 2511 (2003) (finding no
change in volatility for firms on various trading venues); Bushee et al., supra note 208, at
617 (finding increased volatility for firms on various trading venues); Alberto
Dell’Acqua et al., Conference Calls and Stock Price Volatility in the Post-Reg FD Era,
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proxy for risk, and these factors also influence market makers’ inventory
holding costs.211 To turn to the link between regulation and liquidity of
equity markets, several studies documented a decrease in bid-ask spreads
for a number of trading venues after the passage of Reg FD,212 although
another contribution found increased bid-ask spreads on the NYSE, the
AMEX, and NASDAQ.213 A group of studies concluded that the adverse
selection component decreased in both relative and absolute terms for
stocks on the NYSE after the regulatory change,214 which is consistent
with its effectiveness if the applicable bid-ask spread decomposition methodology is accurate. By contrast, another contribution found that the
adverse selection component substantially increased in both relative and
absolute terms for stocks on NASDAQ post-Reg FD, while bid-ask

16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 256, 268–69 (2010) (finding lower volatility for high-tech firms on
the NYSE and NASDAQ); Jennifer Francis et al., Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation
Fair Disclosure Using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks, 41 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 271, 281–82 (2006) (finding lower volatility for firms on various trading
venues, but not relative to foreign firms exempt from Reg FD); Chun I. Lee et al., Effect
of Regulation FD on Asymmetric Information, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 2004, at 79,
79 (finding “no significant increase in volatility” for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ); Mendelson et al., supra note 206, at 31 (finding lower volatility for firms on
the NYSE); Carnaghan & Sivakumar, supra note 208, at 22 (finding no increase in volatility for firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ); see also Dana Hobson, Effects
of Regulation and Technology on U.S. Stocks: Evidence from Earnings Announcements,
J. TRADING, Spring 2007, at 89, 93 (“The changes brought about by Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley led to a doubling of volatility in response to EPS [earnings per share] announcements [for firms on different trading venues].”).
210
See Zhihong Chen et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 106, 139 (2010) (“[T]he cost of capital decreases significantly
for a broad cross-section of US firms [on various trading venues] in the post-Reg FD
period relative to the pre-Reg FD period.... [compared to foreign firms] which are exempt
from Reg FD.”); Armando Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information,
and the Cost of Capital, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 300, 330 (2007) (“[S]mall firms [on the NYSE
and NASDAQ] were adversely affected by Reg FD; their cost of capital rose.”).
211
See Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, supra note 1, at 133 &
n.246, 172–73 & nn.501–03 (discussing the impact of volatility and risk on market makers’ inventory holding costs).
212
Chiyachantana et al., supra note 206, at 552 (data from the NYSE); Venkat R.
Eleswarapu et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry, 39 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 209, 223 (2004) (data from the NYSE);
Mendelson et al., supra note 206, at 31 (data from the NYSE); Carnaghan & Sivakumar,
supra note 208, at 22 (data from the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ).
213
Lee et al., supra note 209, at 87.
214
Chiyachantana et al., supra note 206, at 552; Eleswarapu et al., supra note 212, at
210.
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spreads decreased,215 which raises doubts about the effectiveness of this
regulatory measure or the accuracy of the bid-ask spread decomposition
methodology. Yet another study found that the adverse selection component stayed the same in absolute terms and decreased in relative terms for
stocks on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ post-Reg FD.216
Several cross-country studies analyzed the impact of insider trading
regulation on bid-ask spreads and their components and market depths in
equity markets, while another approach linked such regulation and other
measures of market liquidity.217 One study examined the world’s leading
stock exchanges and concluded that the enforcement of insider trading
regulation is associated with lower bid-ask spreads.218 A study of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded on the NYSE indicated that the
link between the enforcement of insider trading laws and bid-ask spreads
is statistically insignificant,219 while a later study of a similar sample of
ADRs traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ concluded that such enforcement is associated with narrower bid-ask spreads, greater market depths,
and smaller adverse selection costs.220 Another contribution examined the
impact of key features of insider trading regulation on bid-ask spreads and
different estimates of the adverse selection component.221 This analysis
has yielded a number of correlations with different levels of significance,
with some of them supporting the link between regulation and greater
market liquidity, but no significant correlations were detected among any
215

Baljit Sidhu et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection,
46 J. ACCT. RES. 697, 697, 707, 715–16 (2008).
216
Lee et al., supra note 209, at 86.
217
See, e.g., Beny, supra note 5, at 264, 280 (stock market turnover, defined as “the
ratio of the total value traded to total stock market capitalization”); Hazem Daouk et al.,
Capital Market Governance: How Do Security Laws Affect Market Performance?, 12 J.
CORP. FIN. 560, 560, 562 (2006) (trading volume, defined as “[t]he ratio of dollar traded
per month to the dollar market capitalization at the end of the month,” and market depth,
defined as “[t]he ratio of trading volume to the standard deviation of daily returns (or the
absolute value of monthly return) computed each month”); Thomas Lagoarde-Segot,
Financial Reforms and Time-Varying Microstructures in Emerging Equity Markets, 33 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1755, 1761, 1769 (2009) (illiquidity, defined as “the variation in asset
prices per unit of trading volume”).
218
Pankaj Jain, Improving Liquidity Through Efficient Stock Market Structure and
Operational Design, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION, Nov. 2006, at 151, 159.
219
Venkat R. Eleswarapu & Kumar Venkataraman, The Impact of Legal and Political
Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 19 REV. FIN. STUD.
1081, 1084 (2006).
220
Kee H. Chung & Hao Zhang, Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality:
Evidence from American Depositary Receipts, 39 ASIA-PAC. J. FIN. STUD. 340, 342
(2010).
221
Frijns et al., supra note 159.

2012]

INSIDER TRADING, INFORMED TRADING

51

of these measures of liquidity and such important features as the actual
existence of criminal enforcement and the strength of the public regulator.222 A different study considered the impact of insider trading regulation
in France and the United Kingdom and found a decrease in bid-ask
spreads only in the former nation, attributing this result to the consistency
of enforcement.223 Yet another study found that the existence of certain
“insider trading” exchange-mandated rules lowers bid-ask spreads, but
such rules relate to the conduct of securities market professionals, such as
front-running, trading ahead of research reports, affiliation, and intimidation/coordination, rather than the conduct of true insiders.224
VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
A further key area of research considers various firm characteristics
that relate to information asymmetry and informed trading in order to test
their impact on liquidity of equity markets and adverse selection costs.
One study analyzed various characteristics, such as volatility, volume,
leverage, institutional ownership, security analyst activities, book-tomarket ratios, the importance of intangible assets, and R&D expenses, and
concluded that
most of the variables that measure information asymmetries [on the
NYSE] are not related to adverse selection. The informed trader proxies
have some impact on adverse selection, but the impact is not uniform
across the [bid-ask spread decomposition] models. No single model appears to perform significantly better than the others.225

Another study of the NYSE focused on similar variables, such as R&D
expenses, the importance of physical assets, firm age, and insiders’ transactions, and asserted that “estimates of adverse selection costs ... are related to firm characteristics that ex ante should be associated with information asymmetry,”226 although the overall results appear to be
ambiguous.227 The same study also looked at other variables, such as
book-to-market ratios, P/E ratios, and security analyst forecasts, and found
222
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“only weak evidence to suggest that the [adverse selection] measures are
related to [these] proxies for a firm’s investment opportunity set.”228
One contribution analyzed the impact of corporate governance—by using an index and its components, such as management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social
awareness—on the adverse selection component for stocks on the Singapore Exchange and concluded that “higher quality corporate governance
lowers the adverse selection component.”229 Another study analyzed
stocks on the NYSE and the AMEX and found “that changes in bid-ask
spreads at the time of earnings announcements are significantly negatively
related to board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock
holdings of directors and officers [and] that depth changes are significantly positively related to board structure, board activity, and directors’ and
officers’ percentage stock holdings.”230 But the same study stated that “[a]
sizable body of prior research indicates that boards that do a more effective job of monitoring management enhance the quality and the frequency
of information released by management,”231 which suggests that this effect
on market liquidity may be at least partially attributed to a channel other
than informed trading. By contrast, another contribution found no evidence that insider holdings have an impact on adverse selection costs for
stocks on various trading venues and argued that different dimensions of
liquidity are affected by the institutional ownership level and its concentration,232 which may be attributed to informed trading other than insider
trading. Yet another study found a correlation between the greater percentage of equity held by the largest institutional investor, as opposed to the
second largest institutional investor or all other institutional investors
combined, and bid-ask spreads for stocks on NASDAQ.233
Another study maintained that the magnitude of retail shareholdings is
associated with smaller bid-ask spreads for stocks on the Australian Stock
Exchange and hypothesized that “retail participation, in conjunction with
measures to increase shareholder numbers, may assist to reduce the proba228
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bility of trading with an informed trader, reducing adverse selection costs
and spreads.”234 A related study of the Toronto Stock Exchange argued
that “stocks with greater deviations between ultimate control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid-ask
spread and wider bid-ask spread.”235 A different study analyzed stocks on
Euronext Paris and concluded that “the adverse selection component of the
spread is increasing with the ultimate and direct percentage of capital held
by the main and the second shareholders, confirming that controlling
shareholders are informed traders”236 and that “[t]he deviation between
ultimate control and ownership increases the spread [and its adverse selection component].”237
Providing a different perspective, one contribution analyzed the impact
of the expiration of lockup provisions and found a decrease in bid-ask
spreads for stocks on the NYSE and NASDAQ, which was primarily attributed to a decline in the adverse selection component,238 thus “not
find[ing] any support for the hypothesized adverse information effects of
insider selling in the post-lockup expiration period.”239 A study of the
HKSE also analyzed the expiration of lockup provisions, but it found
wider bid-ask spreads for stocks and argued that this result “is likely to be
caused by the potential sales by insiders and the risk for market makers to
end up trading with better informed insiders.”240 An additional contribution suggested that announcements of losses or negative earnings changes
are associated with a smaller decline in bid-ask spreads and larger adverse
selection costs for stocks of firms on the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ, as opposed to firms with positive earnings announcements.241
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Another study found that better scores for an index capturing various
factors for individual firms, such as disclosure, corporate governance, and
investor rights, are associated with smaller bid-ask spreads and the adverse
selection component for stocks on the NYSE,242 but the impact of informed trading—and, even more so, insider trading—was not isolated.243
A different contribution, which focused on country-wide factors, analyzed
ADRs traded on the NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ and argued that
bid-ask spreads and the adverse selection component are “positively correlated with information opaqueness and poor protection of investor rights in
the capital market environment of the home countries.”244 A similar study
analyzed ADRs traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ and concluded that
“ADRs of firms operating in good investor protection environments tend
to have both lower information asymmetry costs and higher liquidity levels [as measured by bid-ask spreads and market depths].”245
Overall, studies addressing various firm characteristics that relate to
information asymmetry and informed trading do not amount to a consistent pattern, and conclusions of such studies often depend on the validity
of the applicable bid-ask spread decomposition methodology. Furthermore, several studies that analyzed the connection between informed trading and market liquidity have causal factors that appear to be relatively
remote,246 which also casts doubts on similar research.
CONCLUSION
A balanced analysis of empirical studies and other evidence shows
that the link between the impact of insider trading on market makers and
market liquidity is quite weak in the context of many regulated and unregulated securities markets. Market makers do not necessarily absorb the
bulk of losses even if insider trading is viewed as a “zero-sum game” for
242
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insiders and outsiders in a static framework.247 In fact, market makers are
more concerned with certain types of short-term informed trading that has
a direct impact on their losses and, hence, market liquidity. In many instances, the adverse impact of insider trading on market makers may all
but drown in the impact of overall order flow imbalances, inventory management, and short-term informed trading—without creating liquidity
externalities in securities markets.
One group clearly harmed by insider trading—with implications for liquidity of the applicable markets—consists of options market makers.
While transactions on inside information in options may make the market
for the underlying security more “efficient” via additional price-related
signals, depending on the effectiveness of price discovery and its transmission, and, consequently, more liquid, the decrease in liquidity of options markets may have adverse consequences for equity markets as well.
Thus, these countervailing forces make social welfare calculations quite
difficult.
Overall, the current level of insider trading appears to have no significant adverse effect on equity market makers, and any further tightening of
insider trading regulation and additional enforcement is unlikely to increase liquidity of equity markets. However, completely freeing the modern financial marketplace from regulatory restrictions on insider trading
may present substantial problems for all types of market makers, but it is
not a foregone conclusion. Although observing order flow that includes
transactions based on inside information may still generate tangible benefits for these market participants, the erosion of their institutional advantages must be taken into account.
Quite frequently, the existing empirical research on the link between
informed trading and liquidity is used selectively to justify the necessity of
insider trading regulation,248 and relevant conceptual, methodological, and
measurement flaws and contradictions are largely ignored. Bid-ask spread
decomposition studies are the Achilles’ heel of the efforts to use empirical
research in support of insider trading regulation because of the uncertainty
247
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regarding how “noisy” such results are and what exactly they measure.
Even similar data sets and methodologies produce a wide range of estimates of the cost of informed trading—frequently, without isolating the
impact of insider trading as such—and, perhaps, in many cases, there is no
unique “superior” methodology. Of course, these observations are not a
general mistrust of advanced econometric techniques, but a call for an
understanding of their limitations in public policy debates in order to
avoid far-reaching conclusions based on very imprecise proxies. In fact,
there is a need for further empirical research that would separate insider
trading from other forms of informed trading and answer questions relating to such issues as the detection of insider trading activity by market
makers and the use of inferred information, the impact of insider trading
on inventory management by market makers, actual responses of market
makers to perceived insider trading, the impact of insider trading in derivatives on equity markets, and the effect of insider trading as such on
volatility.249 In that respect, one necessary and difficult task consists of
designing econometric proxies for the extent and impact of insider trading
that are more reliable than the adverse selection component of bid-ask
spreads or PIN estimates.
Given the ambiguity of the existing evidence on the link between insider trading and market liquidity—without an undue focus on outlier
studies—it follows that the search for real economic costs of insider trading is not over. Perhaps the impact of insider trading on corporate governance, such as agency, incentives, and disclosure issues, is a more fruitful
area for debating the desirability and the appropriate reach of regulation.250 Another important question concerns the identity of “losers” in the
249
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“zero-sum game” between insiders and outsiders. It is entirely possible
that an increasing portion of trading losses from insider trading of outsiders as a group is borne by high-frequency traders, given their growing
importance,251 whether de facto market makers or not, because of the
largely marginal nature of their transactions.252 Furthermore, the social
utility of certain strategies employed by such traders has been repeatedly
questioned—although this issue is controversial on both conceptual and
empirical levels—by legislators, regulators, industry professionals, and
researchers.253
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